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REACHING WITHIN SILK ROAD: THE 
NEED FOR A NEW SUBPOENA POWER 
THAT TARGETS ILLEGAL BITCOIN 
TRANSACTIONS 
Abstract: With the rise of Bitcoin and other virtual currencies, it has become 
crucial for government regulatory bodies to catch up. Black market sites like 
the now-defunct Silk Road have continued to exploit the anonymity of Bitcoin 
to engage in illegal transactions. In order to identify criminal Bitcoin users, 
the government must respond with an updated criminal subpoena standard 
that addresses virtual currencies. This Note argues that the gap should be 
filled by combining current e-discovery standards from Rule 26 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure with elements of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act’s subpoena powers. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the increasingly public digital age, virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, 
have become very attractive to those seeking online privacy.1 Although some 
users purchase Bitcoin for the novelty value, others opt in because of the 
heightened confidentiality and security Bitcoin provides.2 Bitcoin transactions 
are protected by electronic encryptions that ensure the user’s identity is well 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Derek A. Dion, Note, I’ll Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for a Byte Today: 
Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud in the E-conomy of Hacker-Cash, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 
165, 167 (explaining the decentralized nature of Bitcoin and its advantages); Jonathan Lane, Note, 
Bitcoin, Silk Road, and the Need for a New Approach to Virtual Currency Regulation, 8 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 511, 520 (2014) (noting that privacy is “integral” to Bitcoin’s popularity); 
Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq [http://perma.cc/728R-U449] [here-
inafter BITCOIN] (listing reasons why people trust and use bitcoins by highlighting the lack of third 
party reliance or control over the Bitcoin network); see also Prableen Bajpai, The 5 Most Important 
Virtual Currencies Other Than Bitcoin, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.investopedia.
com/articles/investing/121014/5-most-important-virtual-currencies-other-bitcoin.asp [http://perma.
cc/ECW2-JCK6] (describing the benefits of other popular virtual currencies). Throughout this 
Note, the term “Bitcoin” refers to the virtual currency system, while the term “bitcoin” refers to 
the units of the virtual currency. 
 2 Dion, supra note 1, at 169; see BITCOIN, supra note 1 (listing financial security and trans-
parency among the benefits of Bitcoin); Cameron Graham, Out of the Spotlight, Bitcoin Gains 
Legitimacy, WIRED (Sept. 15, 2014, 2:34 PM), http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/09/bitcoin-
gains-legitimacy/ [http://perma.cc/PC8H-2GKF] (analyzing the ebb and flow of interest in Bitcoin 
as the virtual currency’s novelty value wears off). 
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hidden.3 This anonymity not only prevents exploitation of user information 
and online activity, but it also allows many individuals to partake in easy and 
untraceable illicit transactions.4 As a result, individuals who flock to Bitcoin 
use it for both legal and criminal purposes.5 
The government has struggled to eliminate illegal Bitcoin marketplac-
es.6 Despite shutting down Silk Road and arresting its operator, the gov-
ernment has been unable to reach the website’s account holders.7  Even 
though Silk Road has closed, other black market sites remain unfazed.8 In-
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Dion, supra note 1, at 168 (describing Bitcoin’s use of a public key in order to maintain 
user anonymity); Lane, supra note 1, at 520 (explaining that Bitcoin’s public key hides the user’s 
identity); Jonathan B. Turpin, Note, Bitcoin: The Economic Case for a Global, Virtual Currency 
Operating in an Unexplored Legal Framework, 21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 335, 338 (2014) 
(stating that Bitcoin does not compromise user identity during transactions); see also Lawrence 
Trautman, Virtual Currencies; Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. 
Gox?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13, 8 (2014) (calling Bitcoin’s encryption-provided anonymity a 
challenge for law enforcement). 
 4 See Trautman, supra note 3, at 2 (linking virtual currencies to a list of crimes facilitated by 
its anonymity benefits); Dion, supra note 1, at 169 & n.2 (discussing the ways in which users can 
conduct illegal transactions through Bitcoin exchanges); Lane, supra note 1, at 524 (acknowledg-
ing that Silk Road’s anonymity is tied to its policy of solely accepting Bitcoin transactions). 
 5 See Larry McIntyre, Staff Article, Cyber-Takings: The War on Crime Moves into the Cloud, 
14 PITT. J. TECH. L. POL’Y 333, 342 (2014) (mentioning Bitcoin’s ties to the black market website 
Silk Road); BITCOIN, supra note 1 (discussing the various businesses that accept Bitcoin payments 
and addressing the potential for illegal use). 
 6 See McIntyre, supra note 5, at 343 (mentioning government monitoring of Silk Road); Joon 
Ian Wong, Dark Markets Grow Bigger and Bolder in Year Since Silk Road Bust, COINDESK (Oct. 
6, 2014, 8:00 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/dark-markets-grow-bigger-bolder-year-since-silk-
road-bust [http://perma.cc/PZ6M-P56W] (examining the impact of the government takedown of 
Silk Road on black market Bitcoin sites); see also Daniel Palmer, How Deep Web Scams Helped 
Silk Road 2.0 Turn Crisis into Opportunity, COINDESK (May 1, 2014, 3:23 PM), http://www.coin
desk.com/dark-web-scams-helped-silk-road-2-0-turn-crisis-opportunity [http://perma.cc/S2A8-TVAT] 
(noting the continued proliferation of websites that promulgate black market Bitcoin transactions). 
Silk Road and Mt. Gox, two popular illegal Bitcoin marketplaces, are now defunct but many other 
black market websites remain operational in their place. See Palmer, supra. 
 7 See McIntyre, supra note 5, at 344 (detailing the government’s actions against the owner of 
Silk Road and the government’s inability to reach individual users of the website); see also Press 
Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Forfeiture 
of $28 Million Worth of Bitcoins Belonging to Silk Road (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/
usao/nys/pressreleases/January14/SilkRoadForfeiture.php [http://perma.cc/5MJC-GYNQ] (indi-
cating that the government prefers using civil forfeiture to target Silk Road users rather than at-
tempting to unmask individual violators). Silk Road was one of the most prevalent online market-
places that facilitated criminal Bitcoin interactions. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 5, at 343 (iden-
tifying Silk Road as an underground market for illegal activity); Turpin, supra note 3, at 357–58 
(describing Silk Road’s illicit transactions); David Segal, Eagle Scout. Idealist. Drug Trafficker?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/business/eagle-scout-idealist-
drug-trafficker.html [http://perma.cc/94L6-ASCT] (characterizing Silk Road as “the world’s larg-
est and most notorious black market for drugs”). 
 8 See Palmer, supra note 6 (calling the shutdown of Silk Road an opportunity for other sites); 
see also JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, MERCATUS CTR., GEORGE MASON UNIV., BITCOIN: 
A PRIMER FOR POLICY MAKERS 25 (Dec. 19, 2013), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Brito_
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deed, many other replacement sites have appeared to fill the gap left by Silk 
Road.9 Black market websites will continue to operate and exploit Bitcoin 
until the government begins to target the individual Bitcoin users who sell 
and purchase goods and services using these sites.10 
To alleviate the problem of these illegal transactions, the U.S. Supreme 
Court and Congress must create a subpoena power that specifically aims to 
unmask the identity of individual Bitcoin users.11 Without the ability to 
subpoena third parties to gain access to the documentation that identifies the 
Bitcoin users engaged in illegal transactions, the government will face diffi-
culty in limiting the growth of illegal activity among Bitcoin users.12 But, 
because of the lack of e-discovery standards in criminal litigation, targeting 
individual Bitcoin users may lead to an overreach of government power.13 
                                                                                                                           
BitcoinPrimer_v1.3.pdf [http://perma.cc/9E7L-RK48] (stating that Silk Road’s shutdown did little 
to prevent other black market sites from flourishing). 
 9 Palmer, supra note 6 (remarking that Silk Road’s closure did not lead to the shutdown of 
other black market sites); Wong, supra note 6 (stating that a number of dark markets appeared 
after the government closed down Silk Road). But see BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 25 
(acknowledging that sites have opened hoping to replace Silk Road but pointing out that some 
have been unsuccessful and are now defunct due to internal security reasons). 
 10 See Palmer, supra note 6 (illustrating that the government’s takedown of Silk Road has not 
alleviated the problem of online marketplaces for illegal Bitcoin transactions); Wong, supra note 6 
(describing the flourishing black market one year after Silk Road’s demise). 
 11 See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 25 (discussing the closure of some black market 
sites due to security issues rather than any governmental interference); Palmer, supra note 6 (indi-
cating that the government has not been able to substantively prevent illegal Bitcoin transactions). 
Compare Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, supra note 7 (showing the government’s indirect 
targeting of illicit Bitcoin use), with BITCOIN, supra note 1 (noting that it is possible for the gov-
ernment to directly target Bitcoin users abusing the virtual currency). 
 12 See Palmer, supra note 6 (discussing the return of multiple new black market sites after the 
shutdown of Silk Road). 
 13  Daniel B. Garrie et al., “Criminal Cases Gone Paperless”: Hanging with the Wrong 
Crowd, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 521, 527 (2010). See generally McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (discussing a First Amendment right to anonymity). This Note 
does not address how the government should regulate the Bitcoin market to overcome its anonym-
ity features. See infra notes 161–200 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the necessary 
regulatory measures, see Lane, supra note 1, at 553–56 (analyzing the financial regulations that 
state legislatures should impose upon Bitcoin wallet providers and exchanges). Once such regula-
tions are in place, government entities will then have the ability to subpoena sites for access to 
Bitcoin user information. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938 (signaling the IRS’s 
recognition of Bitcoin and indicating how general tax principles apply to virtual currency); FIN. 
CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S 
REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, 
FIN-2013-G001, at 1–6 (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-
2013-G001.pdf [http://perma.cc/7EWF-NNR9] (providing guidance on the applicability of Fin-
CEN regulations to virtual currency users); see also Lane, supra note 1, at 554–55 (arguing that 
financial regulation of Bitcoin will help facilitate criminal investigations). It is unlikely legislators 
will focus on shutting down the entire Bitcoin network. See Jim Harper, Bitcoin Foundation Lob-
bying, BITCOIN FOUNDATION (July 9, 2014), http://bitcoinfoundation. org/forum/index.php?/topic/
1043-bitcoin-foundation-lobbying/ [http://perma.cc/5XPD-7686] (positing that it is impossible to 
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Therefore, it is also necessary to create a standard limiting this new pow-
er—a standard that is tailored to ensure that the constitutional rights of 
Bitcoin users who are not engaged in illegal activity remain intact.14 
In constructing a criminal subpoena standard, it is important to look to 
existing civil e-discovery rules, which address the use of electronically 
stored information.15 Parties can look to Rule 26 and Rule 45 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance on the use of e-discovery.16 Perhaps 
most importantly, these standards include limitations on e-discovery that 
rein in the moving party’s ability to request a burdensome amount of infor-
mation.17 Furthermore, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) 
                                                                                                                           
eliminate Bitcoin and implying that legislative action would only impede Bitcoin’s growth); 
Timothy B. Lee, Bitcoin Has Become Too Powerful for Regulators to Shut It Down, VOX (Dec. 
16, 2014, 2:20 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/12/16/7403507/bitcoin-has-become-too-powerful-
for-regulators-to-shut-it-down [http://perma.cc/8WTK-A4ZY] (arguing that regulators have been 
convinced to keep Bitcoin around); see also Jon Russell, Coinbase Is Opening the First Regulated 
Bitcoin Exchange in the U.S., TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 25, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/01/25/
coinbase-us-bitcoin-exchange [http://perma.cc/E9NG-U27J] (reporting Coinbase’s announcement 
that it will be opening a regulated Bitcoin exchange). But see Henry Farrell, Bitcoin’s Financial 
Network Is Doomed, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/12/16/bitcoins-financial-network-is-doomed [http://perma.cc/3Q3J-SFBA] (responding 
to Lee’s contention that Bitcoin will succeed by arguing that government regulators will turn 
against the virtual currency). This Note will go through next steps once the government is capable 
of easily targeting individual users. See infra notes 161–200 and accompanying text. 
 14 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010) (conflating money 
with speech through a discussion of how speakers have a First Amendment right to use money to 
fund political speech); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 334 (indicating that anonymous speech rights are an 
important part of the First Amendment); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) (holding 
that the First Amendment protects anonymous Internet speakers). 
 15 Garrie et al., supra note 13, at 526–27. 
 16 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 45 (providing the standards for e-discovery in civil litigation); Gar-
rie et al., supra note 13, at 523 (analyzing the impact of e-discovery on criminal litigation and the 
need to regulate e-discovery in a criminal context); see also Steven C. Bennett, E-Discovery: Rea-
sonable Search, Proportionality, Cooperation, and Advancing Technology, 30 J. INFO. TECH. & 
PRIVACY L. 433, 433 (2014) (discussing the application of discovery to electronically stored in-
formation). Congress updated the Rules of Civil Procedure on December 1, 2006, implementing 
the changes proposed by the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—whose 
members are appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s 
note to 2006 amendment; FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment; Gar-
rie et al., supra note 13, at 526 (indicating the amendments were a response to the growing need for 
regulation of e-discovery); Committee Membership Selection, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/committee-membership-selection [http://perma.cc/U62B-WX
BJ] (providing an overview of how Rules Advisory Committee members are appointed); How the 
Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-
process/how-rulemaking-process-works [http://perma.cc/W62G-B7BT] (discussing the process for 
amendment of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and other federal 
rules). Rule 26 addresses general provisions governing discovery and Rule 45 regulates civil sub-
poena standards. FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 45. 
 17 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (presenting limitations on the scope of e-discovery); see also Ben-
nett, supra note 16, at 435–40 (reviewing two new limits on e-discovery: reasonableness and pro-
portionality). 
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sets aside specific subpoena powers that allow plaintiffs to obtain the identi-
ties of anonymous Internet users from third parties.18 
This Note argues that the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress should cre-
ate a criminal subpoena standard to target Bitcoin users who abuse the virtual 
currency in illegal ways.19 This standard should be broader than the subpoena 
powers within § 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act but more 
restrictive than overall criminal subpoena powers to prevent abuse of subpoe-
nas duces tecum.20 Part I examines the development, functionality, and uses 
of Bitcoin as well as basic civil and criminal discovery standards.21 Part II 
explores developments in e-discovery and how civil and criminal procedural 
rules address electronically stored information.22 Part III argues that the U.S. 
Supreme Court and Congress should create a new criminal subpoena stand-
ard, modeled from current e-discovery laws, that targets criminal Bitcoin use 
but protects the constitutional rights of legitimate Bitcoin users.23 
I. THE NEW GOLD RUSH: THE RISE OF BITCOIN AND ITS USE AND  
ABUSE IN THE CRIMINAL WORLD 
This Part discusses the rise of Bitcoin and its popularity in legitimate 
and criminal contexts.24 Section A explains how to obtain bitcoins as well as 
the security features that allow Bitcoin to protect the anonymity of its us-
ers.25 Section B addresses Bitcoin’s various advantages and its increasing 
legitimacy.26 Section C explores both the exploitation of Bitcoin and the 
events that led to the dissolution of Silk Road.27 
A. Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currencies 
Bitcoin is a type of virtual currency.28 Many virtual currencies exist as 
computer files; similar to actual cash, virtual currency can be destroyed or 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012) (detailing the subpoena 
standard under the DMCA); PATRICIA L. BELLIA ET AL., CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND 
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 408–11 (4th ed. 2011) (describing the use of the 
DMCA’s § 512(h) subpoenas). 
 19 See infra notes 161–200 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 186–200 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 24–95 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 96–160 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 161–200 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 24–95 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 28–57 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 58–68 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 69–95 and accompanying text. Silk Road was an underground black market 
that operated solely through the exchange of bitcoins. See McIntyre, supra note 5, at 342–43 (de-
scribing the misuse of Bitcoin on Silk Road). 
 28 Turpin, supra note 3, at 339; see also Bajpai, supra note 1 (listing other common types of 
virtual currencies).  
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lost.29 Typically, individuals exchange or transmit virtual currency over the 
Internet for goods or services and leave no physical trace of each transac-
tion.30 What separates Bitcoin from other virtual currencies is its adoption 
of peer-to-peer networking and cryptography.31 As the first cryptocurrency, 
Bitcoin is decentralized and is not controlled by a bank or government enti-
ty.32 It survives purely in an intangible electronic medium.33 
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto created Bitcoin in response to rising worries 
about the amount of control governments have over traditional currencies.34 A 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Student Article, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Cur-
rency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 116 (2012) (ex-
plaining what Bitcoin is and how it works); CAL. DEP’T OF BUS. OVERSIGHT, WHAT YOU 
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 1–2 (2014), http://www.dbo.ca.gov/Consumers/
Advisories/Virtual_Currencies_0414.pdf [http://perma.cc/SS5U-SGWB] (defining virtual curren-
cy and clarifying the associated risks); see also Mike Belshe, Are Consumer Bitcoin Balances 
Especially Vulnerable to Hacking?, COIN CTR. (Dec. 1, 2014), http://coincenter.org/2014/12/
consumer-safety [http://perma.cc/J6GW-AJJ2] (providing an overview of Bitcoin). 
 30 See Danton Bryans, Note, Bitcoin and Money Laundering: Mining for an Effective Solu-
tion, 89 IND. L.J. 441, 442–43 (2014) (detailing how virtual currencies function); Dion, supra note 
1, at 183 (emphasizing Bitcoin’s intangible nature); Turpin, supra note 3, at 352 (promoting 
Bitcoin as an option that ameliorates the risks associated with physical currencies). 
 31 Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & 
TECH. L.J. 159, 160 (2012); see Bryans, supra note 30, at 443 (“Bitcoin is a decentralized, virtual-
ly anonymous (commonly called pseudonymous), peer-to-peer (transactions occur directly be-
tween users) network.”). Cryptography is “the art or practice of writing in code or cipher.” Cryp-
tography, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/45374?redirectedFrom=
cryptography#eid [http://perma.cc/8PCR-TF74]. 
 32 Grinberg, supra note 31, at 162; BITCOIN, supra note 1 (confirming that Bitcoin is the first 
cryptocurrency); accord Mariella Moon, A Brief Attempt at Explaining the Madness of Cryptocur-
rency, ENGADGET (Jan. 21, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.engadget.com/2015/01/21/cryptocurrency-
explainer/ [http://perma.cc/MH9K-JMRU] (providing information on cryptocurrencies in general); 
see Bryans, supra note 30, at 443 (outlining Bitcoin’s decentralized structure); Definition of Crypto-
currency, COINPURSUIT, https://www.coinpursuit.com/pages/what-is-cryptocurrency/ [http://perma.
cc/36BV-2ABH] (defining cryptocurrency as encrypted currency). Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency 
because it uses code for encryption protection. See Cryptography, supra note 31 (defining cryp-
tography as “writing in code”); Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 117 (outlining Bitcoin’s use of public 
key encryption). 
 33 See Dion, supra note 1, at 167 (“Bitcoin is an electronic form of floating currency.”). 
 34  Kelsey L. Penrose, Banking on Bitcoin: Applying Anti-Money Laundering and Money 
Transmitter Laws, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 529, 530–31 (2014) (stating that these worries grew 
from distrust of centralized monetary authorities); Turpin, supra note 3, at 342 (citing the lack of 
government control as one of Bitcoin’s attractive attributes). Nakamoto’s actual identity remains 
uncertain; many posit that his name is merely an alias. See Lane, supra note 1, at 514 n.9 (review-
ing the existing information on the Bitcoin creator); see also Bryans, supra note 30, at 444 n.19 
(acknowledging Nakamoto as a pseudonym); Dion, supra note 1, at 167 n.11 (contending that 
Nakamoto is likely a pseudonym). Others contend Nakamoto is actually a group of individuals 
because it is seemingly impossible for a single person to have created something as complex as 
Bitcoin. Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin, WIRED (Nov. 23, 2011, 2:52 PM), http://
www.wired.com/2011/11/mf_bitcoin/ [http://perma.cc/YWJ5-DGRS] (examining different hy-
potheses on Nakamoto’s identity). 
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year later, Nakamoto released Bitcoin, making it an open source code.35 By 
allowing other developers to review and update the code, Nakamoto ensured 
that no single user could control or own the Bitcoin network.36 Bitcoin can 
only operate if all users agree on the Bitcoin protocol.37 This creates a strong 
sense of community for Bitcoin users and strengthens the idea that the people 
control Bitcoin as opposed to the government.38 Unlike traditional currencies, 
which governments regulate and valuate using monetary policy, Bitcoin de-
rives its worth solely from the open marketplace.39 
In order to obtain bitcoins, users either “mine” for them or purchase 
them with real currency.40 Bitcoin miners are paid in bitcoins for executing 
complicated computations that are essential for implementing Bitcoin trans-
actions.41 Bitcoin miners download a software program that allows them to 
connect to the Bitcoin network.42 It also allows miners to verify Bitcoin trans-
                                                                                                                           
 35 BITCOIN, supra note 1 (detailing the creation of Bitcoin); see also Lane, supra note 1, at 
514–15 (stating that Nakamoto published Bitcoin code on the Internet). 
 36 BITCOIN, supra note 1 (explaining who controls the Bitcoin network); see also Bryans, 
supra note 30, at 471 (emphasizing that Bitcoin does not depend on any single developer); Lane, 
supra note 1, at 515 (stating that the peer-to-peer nature of Bitcoin cuts out intermediaries and 
relies on trust within the Bitcoin community); Turpin, supra note 3, at 361 (indicating that 
Bitcoin’s decentralized nature means it lacks a controlling entity). 
 37 BITCOIN, supra note 1; see Pamela J. Martinson & Christopher P. Masterson, Bitcoin and 
the Secured Lender, BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., June 2014, at 13, 14 (affirming that 
Bitcoin users have to adopt a single protocol). Similar to how different versions of a program have 
to be compatible with a computer’s operating system to run properly, users of Bitcoin must main-
tain consistent iterations of Bitcoin. BITCOIN, supra note 1. Unless all users maintain the same 
version of the software, transactions would not work properly because the different versions 
would be incompatible. Id. 
 38 See BITCOIN, supra note 1 (discussing the idea that Bitcoin users are incentivized to work 
in consensus); see also Bryans, supra note 30, at 471 (examining the longevity of Bitcoin due to 
its open source nature and active community). 
 39 See Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 115 (detailing why users favor the virtual currency). For 
example, governments can inflate prices through increased cash production. See Grinberg, supra 
note 31, at 169 (looking at the Federal Reserve’s ability to inflate the value of the dollar). 
 40 See, e.g., Penrose, supra note 34, at 531, 534 (discussing ways to mine and purchase 
bitcoins); Turpin, supra note 3, at 340 (mentioning how users can acquire bitcoins); BITCOIN, 
supra note 1 (specifying methods of obtaining bitcoins). Another alternative is to accept bitcoins 
as payment in a transaction. See Turpin, supra note 3, at 340; BITCOIN, supra note 1. 
 41 See, e.g., Elli Androulaki et al., Evaluating User Privacy in Bitcoin, in FINANCIAL CRYPTOG-
RAPHY AND DATA SECURITY: 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 34, 36–37 (Ahmad-Reza 
Sadeghi ed., 2013), http://book.itep.ru/depository/bitcoin/User_privacy_in_bitcoin.pdf [http://perma.
cc/5E8A-98B4] (describing the payout of Bitcoin mining); Penrose, supra note 34, at 533 (dis-
cussing the incentives for a Bitcoin miner); BITCOIN, supra note 1 (explaining that Bitcoin net-
works reward miners for creating bitcoins). Thus, miners can sidestep the need to convert tradi-
tional currency into bitcoins. Penrose, supra note 34, at 531, 534 (describing the different ways to 
obtain bitcoins); BITCOIN, supra note 1 (providing mining as an alternative to using a Bitcoin 
exchange).  
 42 Penrose, supra note 34, at 531–32 (detailing the mining process); see Turpin, supra note 3, 
at 341 (discussing how a user mines bitcoins). 
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actions.43 For their efforts in reviewing and ensuring that transactions are val-
id, miners receive Bitcoin rewards for each completed block of transactions.44 
The miners’ work ensures that no users are spending their bitcoins more than 
once.45 This setup creates a system of self-regulation of Bitcoin use.46 
Since mining is a complicated process, most individuals obtain bitcoins 
through purchase.47 Users can buy bitcoins from a local cash exchange or an 
online Bitcoin exchange.48 Similar to traditional currency exchange systems 
such as banks, they are third-party services that facilitate transfer of govern-
ment-based currency for bitcoins.49 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Penrose, supra note 34, at 532–33; see Turpin, supra note 3, at 341 (discussing how a user 
mines bitcoins). Users employ an algorithm to solve a mathematical problem to add transactions 
onto blocks. See Penrose, supra note 34, at 532 (outlining the Bitcoin mining process). These 
block chains are made public to everyone on the Bitcoin network. Id. 
 44 Penrose, supra note 34, at 533; Lane, supra note 1, at 519 (commenting on how Bitcoin 
incentivizes users to become miners). 
 45 See Penrose, supra note 34, at 533 (stating that Bitcoin miners prevent “double spending” 
by rejecting transactions if the user’s balance does not have sufficient funds); see also Lane, supra 
note 1, at 519 (asserting that miners prevent users from spending bitcoins more than once). This is 
known as “double spending.” Penrose, supra note 34, at 533. Because Bitcoin transactions are 
public once they have been added to blocks, miners will be able to reject future transactions that 
attempt to use the same set of bitcoins again. Id. at 532, 533. This solves the need for third party 
involvement from a service such as PayPal to prevent double spending. BRITO & CASTILLO, supra 
note 8, at 4. 
 46 See Penrose, supra note 34, at 533 (outlining the process Bitcoin miners use to verify trans-
actions); see also BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 6 (indicating that Bitcoin’s protocol de-
pends on miners to authenticate transactions and thus maintain the virtual currency’s infrastruc-
ture). 
 47 Penrose, supra note 34, at 534; see Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 121 (noting that using an 
online exchange is an alternate way of getting bitcoins). 
 48 See Penrose, supra note 34, at 534 (explaining how users can obtain bitcoins through third-
party exchange services); Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 121–22 (mentioning that users can use tra-
ditional currencies on exchange sites to get bitcoins). Local exchanges using cash add a degree of 
risk, as there is no guarantee a user will transfer the funds after receiving cash. Penrose, supra note 
34, at 534; see also Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 123 (providing an example of a typical face-to-
face exchange). 
 49 E.g., Grinberg, supra note 31, at 166 (discussing the creation and existence of online 
Bitcoin exchanges); Penrose, supra note 34, at 534 (explaining how Bitcoin exchanges function); 
Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 122 (listing various Bitcoin exchanges and their exchange policies). 
For a few years, Bitcoin transactions remained unregulated by the U.S. government. See Penrose, 
supra note 34, at 534 (acknowledging the lack of Bitcoin exchange regulation prior to the Finan-
cial Crimes Enforcement Network’s guidance); Lane, supra note 1, at 531, 537 (analyzing the 
changes in financial regulatory structure to accommodate Bitcoin). As legal issues surrounding 
Bitcoin emerged, different sectors of the government began addressing virtual currencies. See 
I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, supra note 13 (advising on the taxation of virtual currencies); FIN. CRIMES 
ENF’T NETWORK, supra note 13 (providing guidance for following FinCEN regulations with re-
gard to virtual currencies); Joon Ian Wong, CFTC Chairman: We Have Oversight of Bitcoin Deriva-
tives, COINDESK (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.coindesk.com/cftc-chairman-oversight-bitcoin-
derivatives/ [http://perma.cc/Z5M8-QFWD] (reporting that the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission has taken charge of regulatory oversight of Bitcoin); see also Penrose, supra note 34, 
at 529 (positing that FinCEN’s regulatory measures are only the beginning and that more regula-
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After obtaining bitcoins, individuals can spend the virtual currency in 
two different ways.50 They can run a program on their own personal com-
puter or use an account on a website to hold their Bitcoin “wallet.”51 Much 
like a regular wallet, this electronic wallet stores a user’s virtual currency.52 
Bitcoin wallets use sets of encrypted keypairs—a public key and a private 
key—for security.53 
A wallet’s public key provides or receives payments while the buyer or 
seller retains the private key.54 The public key acts as an address and pro-
vides information that any Bitcoin user will be able to access; however, on-
ly a Bitcoin user’s private key can approve transactions.55 Although the 
public key is traceable, it contains no user information.56 Thus, by using 
only the public key to maintain transaction records, the owners of the ad-
dresses can remain anonymous.57 
B. Advantages and Legal Uses of Bitcoin 
Due to Bitcoin’s growing popularity and its advantages over traditional 
payment methods, many businesses have begun accepting the virtual cur-
rency.58 One crucial advantage is the payment freedom that Bitcoin pro-
                                                                                                                           
tion is necessary to address a virtual currency as complex as Bitcoin). FinCEN is the U.S. Treas-
ury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 2. 
 50 Grinberg, supra note 31, at 162–63 (providing two methods of using bitcoins). 
 51 Id.; see Bryans, supra note 30, at 446 (explaining how a digital wallet works); BITCOIN, 
supra note 1 (detailing how to make a Bitcoin payment). There are several programs users can 
utilize to run the Bitcoin protocol, which allows them to use their bitcoins in transactions. Grin-
berg, supra note 31, at 162 n.15. 
 52 See Grinberg, supra note 31, at 163 (describing the wallet as a file where users store their 
bitcoins); Bryans, supra note 30, at 446 (discussing how an individual uses a wallet to make 
Bitcoin payments). 
 53 E.g., Dion, supra note 1, at 167–68 (analyzing the keypairs that make up a Bitcoin user’s 
wallet); Lane, supra note 1, at 516 (explaining how Bitcoin software uses public and private 
keys); Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 117 (examining the public key encryption Bitcoin uses to en-
sure secure online transactions). 
 54 See Dion, supra note 1, at 168 (analogizing the public key to an address and characterizing 
the private key as an authorization tool); Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 117 (describing how 
Bitcoin’s public and private key system operates). 
 55 Dion, supra note 1, at 168; Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 117; see also BRITO & CASTILLO, 
supra note 8, at 5 (explaining that a public key verifies that a Bitcoin user authorized a transaction 
with his or her private key). 
 56 See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 8 (reiterating that the public key does not reveal 
an individual’s identity); Dion, supra note 1, at 168 (emphasizing that having both public and 
private keys helps maintain a user’s anonymity). 
 57 See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 8 (clarifying that although user identity is not 
revealed by the public key, all transactions from that public key “address” are traceable, and thus 
once a key is linked to a user, the transaction history of that user becomes apparent); Kaplanov, 
supra note 29, at 117 (affirming that keypair encryptions maintain user privacy). 
 58  See Dion, supra note 1, at 169; BITCOIN, supra note 1; COINMAP, http://coinmap.org 
[http://perma.cc/MS35-V6NW] (showing over 2000 businesses that accept Bitcoin as payment); 
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vides.59 Transactions are instantaneous and borderless; unlike banks, which 
restrict users by business hours, holidays, and transfer limits, Bitcoin does 
not impose any limitations on the time, place, or amount of its transac-
tions.60 Furthermore, Bitcoin has very low transaction fees and sellers have 
the ability to bypass the usual cost of accepting a credit card payment.61 
Bitcoin transactions are irreversible and do not involve any identifying 
personal information, which helps minimize fraudulent activity, prevent iden-
tity theft, and shield merchants from fraudulent chargebacks.62 Some busi-
nesses value the additional security so much that they offer discounted rates 
                                                                                                                           
e.g., Pete Rizzo, Industry Views: What Does Microsoft Mean for Bitcoin?, COINDESK (Dec. 11, 
2014, 10:55 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/industry-views-microsoft-mean-bitcoin [http://perma.cc/
KY9D-TE69] (discussing Microsoft’s announcement that it will accept Bitcoin payments for digi-
tal content purchases); Matthew Sparkes, Britons Can Now Buy Dell Computers with Bitcoin, 
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 22, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/11425250/
Britons-can-now-buy-Dell-computers-with-Bitcoin.html [http://perma.cc/H5AP-GKAA] (reporting 
Dell’s decision to accept bitcoins in the United Kingdom and Canada, following its 2014 decision 
to allow Bitcoin payments in the United States as a result of a deal with payment processor Coin-
base); Peter Vieth, Law Firm Pioneers Use of Bitcoin, VA. LAW. WKLY. BLOG (Feb. 16, 2015), 
http://valawyersweekly.com/2015/02/16/law-firm-pioneers-use-of-bitcoin [http://perma.cc/V3TN-
VMQV] (relaying a law firm’s decision to accept Bitcoin as payment). Non-profit organizations 
and charities such as WikiLeaks accept Bitcoin as a currency for donations. Dion, supra note 1, at 
167–68; see also BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 16 (identifying why Bitcoin is attractive to 
charities and organizations in need of funding). Braintree, a subsidiary of online electronic pay-
ment vendor PayPal, has also started letting its merchants accept bitcoins. Graham, supra note 2 
(contending that this news increases Bitcoin’s credibility with the public). Not only is Bitcoin 
popular with online sites, such as Reddit and WordPress, but it also has expanded offline to vari-
ous businesses. BITCOIN, supra note 1 (discussing the rapidly increasing number of Bitcoin users 
and businesses); see also BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that various types of busi-
ness are beginning to accept Bitcoin payments). As of 2015, the value of bitcoins in circulation 
has exceeded $4.45 billion. Bitcoin Network, BITCOIN CHARTS, http://bitcoincharts.com/bitcoin 
[http://perma.cc/NW65-J3ZZ]. 
 59 See Trautman, supra note 3, at 38 (highlighting the instantaneous nature of Bitcoin); Tur-
pin, supra note 3, at 337 (mentioning the ability to move bitcoins across borders); BITCOIN, supra 
note 1 (listing the advantages of using Bitcoin). 
 60 See BITCOIN, supra note 1 (noting that Bitcoin provides many advantages in terms of pay-
ment freedom); e.g., Trautman, supra note 3, at 38; Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 126 (describing 
the ease of moving bitcoins across jurisdictions); Turpin, supra note 3, at 337. 
 61 See Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 172 n.385 (noting that the 1–2% fee merchants pay per 
credit card transaction results in higher prices for consumers); BITCOIN, supra note 1 (emphasiz-
ing a Bitcoin service’s ability to implement lower fees than PayPal or a credit card company); 
accord BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 10–11 (describing why Bitcoin’s low transaction 
costs are attractive to users). These low transaction costs are especially attractive to many small 
businesses. See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 10. 
 62 BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 12 (explaining how Bitcoin solves the issue of charge-
backs); Turpin, supra note 3, at 343 (stating that Bitcoin transactions eliminate chargebacks); 
BITCOIN, supra note 1 (mentioning this as a benefit to using bitcoins). Fraudulent chargebacks are 
“consumer-initiated payment reversals based on a false claim that a product has not been deliv-
ered.” BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 12. Since Bitcoin payments are not reversible, this 
problem is eradicated. Id. 
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for payment in bitcoins.63 Those who dislike government-based currencies are 
also attracted to the security of Bitcoin without the barrier of third party con-
trol.64 
One of the main reasons Bitcoin has become popular is the near ano-
nymity it offers.65 Users are virtually anonymous because its public key en-
cryptions only reference the locations of bitcoins without disclosing any 
other information about the user.66 In this sense, Bitcoin is analogous to 
cash.67 Each transaction is neatly recorded but it becomes difficult for gov-
ernment officials to identify the individuals behind the transactions.68 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 12 (providing Greene Avenue Market as an example 
of a business that gives Bitcoin users a discount); Sarah Jenn, Lawyer.com Gives Discounts for 
Bitcoin Transactions, NEWSBTC (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.newsbtc.com/2015/08/06/lawyer-com-
gives-discounts-for-bitcoin-transactions/ [http://perma.cc/4WVL-8WTP] (reporting that Lawyer.com 
offers discounts for Bitcoin users because the virtual currency has helped the website reduce transac-
tion costs). 
 64 See BITCOIN, supra note 1 (emphasizing that a Bitcoin user has control over each transac-
tion); see also Lane, supra note 1, at 515 (noting that Bitcoin removes intermediaries from a trans-
action). 
 65 See Bryans, supra note 30, at 444–45 (comparing the near anonymity Bitcoin provides with 
the use of cash); Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 126 (citing Bitcoin’s anonymity as an advantage that 
appeals to users); see also Dion, supra note 1, at 168 (detailing Bitcoin’s virtually anonymous 
features). Although some users exploit Bitcoin’s anonymity, others are taking advantage of finan-
cial privacy for legitimate reasons. See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 18 (listing reasons 
why people might need payment anonymity, including “[s]pouses fleeing abusive partners [who] 
need some way to discreetly spend money without being tracked,” and [p]eople seeking contro-
versial health services”). 
 66 See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 12 (explaining that Bitcoin is pseudonymous be-
cause its transactions are recorded and traceable even though a user’s identity is not revealed by 
his or her public key); Dion, supra note 1, at 168 (establishing that although transactions are rec-
orded, account holders stay anonymous); Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 117 (stating that public key 
encryption protects user identity); BITCOIN, supra note 1 (clarifying that bitcoins are only near 
anonymous because of the publicly accessible ledger of transactions that are recorded on the pub-
lic key—even though the public key does not reveal any identifying user information). As bitcoins 
are exchanged between parties, the transactions are made public for authentication purposes but 
the only information linked to each transaction is the bitcoins’ digital address. Kaplanov, supra 
note 29, at 126 (noting that while bitcoins reveal a digital address, they do not reveal user account 
information). 
 67 Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 126 (comparing the use of bitcoins to cash transactions); see 
BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 8 (detailing similarities and differences between Bitcoin and 
cash payments). Much like cash exchanges, when sellers and buyers use Bitcoin, they only ex-
change location and amount information. Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 126. The only difference is 
each user’s public key saves and records his or her Bitcoin transactions, while cash can remain 
completely anonymous. BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 8; see BITCOIN, supra note 1 (com-
menting on the records Bitcoin transactions leave behind). 
 68 See Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 118–19 (calling the compilation of a Bitcoin block chain a 
“publicly available ledger”); Lane, supra note 1, at 530 (pointing to the low number of arrests of 
Silk Road users and concluding that the government is struggling with the complicated process of 
decrypting and uncovering Bitcoin transactions). Every computer on the Bitcoin network can 
access records of all Bitcoin transactions, back to the very first transaction. See Kaplanov, supra 
note 29, at 118; see also BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 9 (acknowledging that these records 
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C. Illegal Uses of Bitcoin 
Although Bitcoin has many benefits, it is also easily exploited for ille-
gal uses.69 Because Bitcoin allows individuals to engage in near anonymous 
and instantaneous monetary transactions, some have exploited the virtual 
currency for criminal use.70 This abuse of the Bitcoin system has overshad-
owed legitimate Bitcoin use.71 
Silk Road and its well-known black market dealings are a striking ex-
ample of illegal Bitcoin use.72 The now-defunct website operated as a mar-
ketplace that linked sellers and buyers in a similar fashion to eBay or 
Craigslist.73 Unlike those legitimate websites, Silk Road provided users the 
opportunity to participate in illegal exchanges and in return pocketed a per-
centage of the sale price as commission.74 A seller would create a listing of 
a good for sale and send the purchased item to the buyer upon receipt of an 
electronic payment.75 Users could sell and obtain drugs, counterfeit IDs, 
stolen credit cards, and much more.76 Silk Road also facilitated transactions 
                                                                                                                           
can go back for years). A timestamp records every time a user creates a bitcoin and every time a 
user exchanges bitcoins. Kaplanov, supra note 29, at 118. 
 69 See McIntyre, supra note 5, at 343 (noting that Silk Road accepted only Bitcoin payments); 
Wong, supra note 6 (indicating that Bitcoin is the preferred payment on most dark market sites). 
 70 See Trautman, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing the reasons why acting U.S. Assistant Attor-
ney General Mythili Raman believed virtual currencies were used for illegal activity); Kaplanov, 
supra note 29, at 128 (pointing to the reasons why Bitcoin is enticing for those engaged in crimi-
nal activity). 
 71 See BITCOIN, supra note 1 (“Bitcoin is money, and money has always been used both for 
legal and illegal purposes.”); see also Palmer, supra note 6 (noting the proliferation of black mar-
ket use of Bitcoin); Wong, supra note 6 (discussing the Bitcoin dark market since Silk Road 
closed). 
 72 See McIntyre, supra note 5, at 342–43. A study showed that over the course of eight 
months between 2011 and 2012, Silk Road users exchanged 1.35 million bitcoins. Wong, supra 
note 6 (citing Nicholas Christin, Traveling the Silk Road: A Measurement Analysis of a Large 
Anonymous Online Marketplace, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 22ND INTERNATIONAL WORLD WIDE 
WEB CONFERENCE 213, 213–24 (2013)) (synthesizing the results of the aforementioned study). 
This only amounted to approximately 4.5% of bitcoins traded on other exchanges during that time, 
though that number likely increased as Silk Road’s popularity grew in 2013. See id. (“Christin 
also found that at the time, 24,000 items were being sold on Silk Road over a six-month period. 
Contrast that to the 13,000 in drug listings alone on Silk Road that the [Digital Citizens Alliance] 
recorded in just one October day, before the bust.”). 
 73 United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (identifying how the 
Silk Road website functioned); McIntyre, supra note 5, at 342–43. 
 74 Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 547; McIntyre, supra note 5, at 343 (discussing the 8–15% 
commission that Silk Road retained for each illegal transaction). 
 75 Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 549; see Lane, supra note 1, at 525 (enumerating the number 
and types of listings available on Silk Road); McIntyre, supra note 5, at 343 (providing examples 
of listings on Silk Road). 
 76 Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 549–50 (denying Ulbricht’s motion to dismiss his multi-count 
indictment for facilitating a list of illegal activities); see Trautman, supra note 3, at 6–15 (detailing 
various illicit uses of Bitcoin). 
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involving assassinations, hacker attacks against specific websites, sex traf-
ficking, corporate espionage, and many other illegal activities.77 
Silk Road accepted only Bitcoin payments and relied on Bitcoin’s an-
onymity capabilities to prevent exposure of criminal activity. 78  Further-
more, only those who used an untraceable Internet browsing network were 
able to access the site.79 During its first year of operation, Silk Road gener-
ated more than twenty-two million dollars of revenue.80 Ross Ulbricht, the 
alleged owner and operator of Silk Road, did not directly sell items in the 
exchanges but profited off the illegal activities taking place on his website 
through commissions.81 Overall, Ulbricht made over eighty million dollars 
during the two plus years he operated Silk Road.82 
It took the U.S. government over two years to uncover the individual 
behind Silk Road.83 Eventually, the FBI shut down Silk Road after success-
fully identifying Ulbricht as the owner and operator.84 On October 1, 2013, 
the government apprehended Ulbricht and charged him with narcotics traf-
ficking and money laundering conspiracies through creating and operating 
Silk Road.85 The FBI seized the bitcoins stored on the website—not only Ul-
bricht’s bitcoins, but also the bitcoins stored in every single Silk Road user 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 550; Trautman, supra note 3, at 6–15. 
 78 See Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 547 (explaining that Silk Road exclusively used Bitcoin 
payments due to Bitcoin’s anonymity features); McIntyre, supra note 5, at 343 (describing the 
benefits of Bitcoin and stating that Silk Road capitalized on these benefits by requiring the site’s 
users to pay with the virtual currency). 
 79 Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 547 (“Ulbricht . . . made the site available only to those using 
Tor, software and a network that allows for anonymous, untraceable Internet browsing.”). 
 80 McIntyre, supra note 5, at 342 (citing Andy Greenberg, Black Market Drug Site ‘Silk Road’ 
Booming: $22 Million in Annual Sales, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2012, 2:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/andygreenberg/2012/08/06/black-market-drug-site-silk-road-booming-22-million-in-annual-
mostly-illegal-sales [http://perma.cc/8VXC-9TRK]). 
 81 See id. (stating that Ulbricht did not personally sell anything on Silk Road); see also Ul-
bricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 550 (reiterating that Ulbricht was not being charged with participating on 
his own website by selling illegal substances). 
 82 McIntyre, supra note 5, at 342; see also Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 550 (contending that 
Ulbricht received “tens of millions” of dollars in commission). 
 83 See Martinson & Masterson, supra note 37, at 16 (attributing the slow movement of the 
FBI investigation to Bitcoin’s anonymity); see also Segal, supra note 7 (mentioning that Silk 
Road was online for two-and-a-half years before Ulbricht was arrested). 
 84 See Martinson & Masterson, supra note 37, at 16 (stating that the FBI shutdown Silk Road 
and arrested Ulbricht in October 2013); see also Segal, supra note 7 (chronicling the series of 
events that led to Ulbricht’s arrest). 
 85 See Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 540 (“Ulbricht conspired with narcotics traffickers and 
hackers to buy and sell illegal narcotics and malicious computer software and to launder the pro-
ceeds using Bitcoin.”); Rachel Cruse, Money Laundering, Narcotrafficking, and the End of the 
Silk Road Web Site, 30 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 1, 1 (2014) (reporting that Ulbricht was 
arrested and charged in a local library). 
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account.86 Following seizure of the bitcoins, the government posted a notice 
of forfeiture.87 No individual, other than Ulbricht, stepped forward to claim 
ownership of any of the twenty-eight million bitcoins taken from user ac-
counts.88 
The FBI was able to prosecute Ulbricht for starting Silk Road because 
he accidentally exposed his identity online.89 The government found Ul-
bricht only after he posted his e-mail information on a Bitcoin discussion 
forum.90 Although the government obtained a substantial amount of bitcoins 
used in illegal transactions on Silk Road, it was unable to identify the indi-
viduals who were committing the illegal acts.91 
                                                                                                                           
 86 McIntyre, supra note 5, at 344 (describing the government takedown of Silk Road and 
Ulbricht); see Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, supra note 7 (announcing civil forfeiture of 
Silk Road’s seized funds). 
 87 McIntyre, supra note 5, at 344; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, supra note 7; see 
also U.S. Marshals to Hold Another Bitcoin Auction, U.S. MARSHALS SERV. (Feb. 18, 2015), 
http://www.usmarshals.gov/news/chron/2015/021815.htm [http://perma.cc/Q55P-7X4V] [herein-
after U.S. MARSHALS] (indicating the government’s intent to auction off the seized bitcoins). By 
using civil forfeiture, the government was able to sidestep identifying and charging individual 
users of Silk Road. McIntyre, supra note 5, at 344. Civil forfeiture enables the government to take 
possession of property that is “an instrumentality of crime.” Id. at 334 (citing Bennis v. Michigan, 
516 U.S. 442, 453–55 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring)). After obtaining the bitcoins in users’ Silk 
Road accounts, U.S. Marshals began auctioning off the seized currency. See U.S. MARSHALS, 
supra (releasing details of the Bitcoin auction). The government used the seized bitcoins as stand-
ins for defendants to support their conspiracy charges against Ulbricht. See Ulbricht, 31 
F. Supp. 3d at 547 (analyzing the complicated legal issues in the government’s case against Ul-
bricht in relation to his part in the alleged conspiracy charges); McIntyre, supra note 5, at 344–45 
(detailing the government’s argument that the bitcoins were defendants). 
 88 See Partial Judgment by Default and Order of Forfeiture at 3, United States v. Ulbricht, No. 13 
Civ. 6919 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2014), http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/
nysdce/1:2013cv06919/418116/19/0.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZT5Y-4RQQ] (stating that Ulbricht was 
the sole Silk Road user who attempted to claim his seized bitcoins); see also Press Release, U.S. 
Attorney’s Office, supra note 7 (relaying news of the government’s civil forfeiture seizure). Ul-
bricht had over $130 million in bitcoins on his computer. McIntyre, supra note 5, at 344; see Press 
Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, supra note 7. 
 89 See Martinson & Masterson, supra note 37, at 16 (noting that Ulbricht revealed his identity 
accidentally through an Internet post); McIntyre, supra note 5, at 343 (detailing the mistakes that 
led to Ulbricht’s exposure). 
 90 Tim Hume, How FBI Caught Ross Ulbricht, Alleged Creator of Criminal Marketplace Silk 
Road, CNN (Oct. 5, 2013, 11:10 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/04/world/americas/silk-road-
ross-ulbricht [http://perma.cc/R5RL-8X4B] (recounting the blunder that resulted in Ulbricht’s ar-
rest); see also Martinson & Masterson, supra note 37, at 16 (discussing the misstep that made 
Ulbricht vulnerable to the authorities). 
 91 See McIntyre, supra note 5, at 344 (mentioning that the government gave up going after the 
actual owners of the bitcoins stored on Silk Road); see also Lane, supra note 1, at 530 (noting that 
the number of arrests was negligible when compared with the amount of Silk Road user accounts). It 
is likely not technologically feasible for the government to unmask each individual user because of 
the anonymity protections that Silk Road utilized. See McIntyre, supra note 5, at 344, 344 n.107 
(citing the unmanageable number of Bitcoin users on Silk Road and the “impossible task of identify-
ing each and every Silk Road user”). This will change as state legislatures continue moving in the 
direction of regulating Bitcoin exchange and wallet websites. See Request for Comment, Conference 
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The downfall of Silk Road was not the end of unlawful uses of Bitcoin.92 
Other competing sites rose up to take its place, including one site named Silk 
Road 2.0.93 As such, the government’s strategy to “take the profit out of crime 
and signal to those who would turn down the dark web for illicit activity that 
they have chosen the wrong path” seems to have been completely unsuccess-
ful.94 The return of these underground marketplaces for the exploitation of 
                                                                                                                           
of State Bank Supervisors, State Regulatory Requirements for Virtual Currency Activities: CSBS 
Draft Model Regulatory Framework and Request for Public Comment (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.
csbs.org/regulatory/ep/Documents/CSBS%20Draft%20Model%20Regulatory%20Framework%20for%
20Virtual%20Currency%20Proposal%20--%20Dec.%2016%202014.pdf [http://perma.cc/327L-JN6X] 
(requesting comments from various institutions to give states recommendations on regulating Bit-
coin); see also Letter from Robert A. Morgan, Dir. of Emerging Techs., Am. Bankers Assoc., to 
Emerging Payments Task Force, Conference of State Bank Supervisors (Feb. 16, 2014), http://www.
csbs.org/regulatory/ep/Documents/ABA%20Framework%20Comment.pdf [http://perma.cc/3367-ZG
AK] (discussing the movement toward state regulation of virtual currencies); PETER VAN VALKEN-
BURGH, COIN CENTER, COMMENTS TO THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS ON THE 
DRAFT MODEL STATE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR VIRTUAL CURRENCY 2–7 (2014), 
http://www.csbs.org/regulatory/ep/Documents/Coin%20Center%20Framework%20Comment.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6HFK-DJWX] (surveying the current status of state regulation of Bitcoin). Currently, 
several states are making initial efforts to regulate Bitcoin. See, e.g., Matthew E. Kohen, Virtual Curren-
cies & the Current State of the Law, 33(9) WESTLAW J. COMPUT. & INTERNET 1, *1–4 (2015), 
http://www.cfjblaw.com/files/uploads/Documents/Articles/WLJ_CMP_3309_Commentary_Kohen.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/P8YN-NS3N] (describing the current regulatory landscape of Bitcoin, highlighting 
Texas, New York, and Connecticut); Kurt Mattson, Bitcoin Bills Making Their Way Through State 
Legislatures, BSA/AML UPDATE 2, Sept. 1, 2015 (on file with author) (summarizing pending 
legislation involving virtual currency); Eric Naing, New York Issues Final Virtual Currency Rules, 
CQ ROLL CALL WASH. BANKING BRIEFING, June 4, 2015, 2015 WL 3503290 (reporting on the final-
ized version of New York’s virtual currency regulations); Alan Zibel & Michael J. Casey, New 
York Tries Again on Bitcoin Licensing, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/new-york-bank-regulator-unveils-revised-bitcoin-licensing-plan-1418922084 [http://perma.
cc/NCR8-WKUL] (detailing the proposal to require Bitcoin payment sites to obtain BitLicenses in 
order to operate); accord Cory Hester, State Bank Regulators Release Model Virtual Currency 
Framework, 33(9) WESTLAW J. COMPUT. & INTERNET 2, *1–2 (2015) (discussing the Conference of 
State Bank Supervisors’ September 2015 recommendation of a model framework for virtual currency 
regulation); Request for Comment, supra (emphasizing that state regulators are working to create 
adequate virtual currency legislation and requesting public commentary in order to generate the best 
regulatory structure); see also VAN VALKENBURGH, supra (noting that New York has decided to 
regulate virtual currency exchanges using a different framework than traditional exchanges). But see 
Craig Mehall, Digital Currency Dealers Leave New York Market, CQ ROLL CALL WASH. BANKING 
BRIEFING, Aug. 14, 2015, 2015 WL 4776938 (revealing that some Bitcoin vendors have decided to 
leave New York rather than comply with new BitLicense regulations). 
 92 Palmer, supra note 6 (discussing the sites that rose up to take over Silk Road’s position); 
accord Wong, supra note 6 (describing the growth of “dark markets” since the Silk Road shut-
down). 
 93 See Palmer, supra note 6; Wong, supra note 6. In fact, Silk Road 2.0 has 5% more open 
listings for illegal drug transactions than Silk Road did when the FBI took down the site. Palmer, 
supra note 6. 
 94 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, supra note 7 (describing the government’s strat-
egy to prevent virtual currency exploitation through civil forfeiture). 
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bitcoins demonstrates that the government cannot only target those who create 
and operate websites like Silk Road.95 
II. LITIGATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE: HOW THE COURTS AND CONGRESS 
HAVE ADDRESSED THE NEED FOR REVISED GUIDELINES ON E-DISCOVERY 
In order to create a criminal subpoena targeting the abuse of virtual 
currencies, the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress need to amend current 
standards to adequately address e-discovery.96 To guide that discussion, this 
Part explores existing e-discovery standards.97 Section A describes how the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address electronically stored infor-
mation.98 Section B examines the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
how the current standards would apply to e-discovery.99 Section C discusses 
the First Amendment implications of unmasking online speakers.100 Section 
D explores the subpoena powers provided by the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act for civil litigants.101 
A. E-Discovery in Civil Litigation 
In recognition of the digital age, the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress 
updated civil discovery rules to include litigant access to electronic infor-
mation.102  The new “e-discovery” standards encompass information that 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See Palmer, supra note 6. 
 96 See infra notes 96–160 and accompanying text. Typically, the relevant Rules Advisory 
Committee will propose an amendment to the federal rules to the U.S. Supreme Court. See How 
the Rulemaking Process Works, supra note 16. The Court will promulgate the revision unless 
Congress rejects or revises the recommended changes. Id. 
 97 See infra notes 96–160 and accompanying text. 
 98 See infra notes 102–117 and accompanying text. 
 99 See infra notes 118–138 and accompanying text. 
 100 See infra notes 139–147 and accompanying text. 
 101 See infra notes 148–160 and accompanying text. 
 102 See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 2457 (3d ed. 2008) (providing background information on a subpoena duces tecum). 
Discovery is a fact-finding procedure that allows litigants to access material facts necessary to 
establish a cause of action. See Burke T. Ward et al., Electronic Discovery: Rules for a Digital 
Age, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 150, 152 (2012) (comparing discovery rules under criminal and 
civil standards). The U.S. Supreme Court has promulgated rules of practice for discovery in feder-
al courts. 2 LESTER B. ORFIELD, ORFIELD’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES 
§ 16:10 (Supp. 2014). Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the standards of 
discovery in civil litigation and Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure dictates dis-
covery standards in criminal cases. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (providing the duty to dis-
close and general provisions governing discovery in a civil lawsuit); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (detail-
ing the discovery and inspection rules in a criminal case). These rules balance the necessity of 
discovery against the burdens of producing the requested information. Bennett, supra note 16, at 
434–35. When determining the scope of discovery and the exact information that should be avail-
able to litigants, courts weigh the efficacy of expediting the process against the economic expense 
of information gathering. See id. (stating the goals of discovery). Discovery standards in criminal 
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exists in an intangible medium and can only be read on a computing de-
vice.103 This broad category includes files saved on a computer as well as 
those located on the Internet.104  
The sheer volume of available electronic data on a computer, tablet, or 
smartphone expands the wealth of information that parties can access 
through discovery.105 Discovery has become much more expensive and on-
erous because of the expansion of discoverable materials from paper files to 
e-discovery.106 Due to the sheer volume of available electronic information, 
companies could spend millions of dollars to remove privileged information 
or work product documents. 107 
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress addressed the growing 
need for e-discovery standards and amended the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure to include electronically stored information.108 Amendments to Rules 
26 and 45 added subsections that specifically incorporated new standards 
                                                                                                                           
cases tend to be narrower than those in civil lawsuits. See 2 ORFIELD, supra, § 16:11 (describing 
the differences between criminal and civil discovery). 
 103 See Bennett, supra note 16, at 433–34 (emphasizing that the wide variety of electronic 
data makes it difficult to determine the scope of e-discovery rules); Ward et al., supra note 102, at 
155 (describing the types of information that would be considered “electronic”). 
 104 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (describing the scope of e-discovery to include “writing, drawings, 
graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations” that 
are “stored in any medium in which information can be obtained directly or, if necessary, after 
translation by the responding party into a reasonably useable form”); Ward et al., supra note 102, 
at 155 (including “email, web pages, word processing files, audio and video files, images, com-
puter databases, [and] spreadsheets” in the list of included data). 
 105 See Bennett, supra note 16, at 445–46 (stating that human review is improbable for cases 
dealing with massive amounts of electronic data); Ward et al., supra note 102, at 155 (discussing 
the volume of information that is accessible with electronic discovery in comparison with conven-
tional paper discovery). 
 106 See Bennett, supra note 16, at 438 (acknowledging the high cost of searching and analyz-
ing obtained documents); Ward et al., supra note 102, at 184 (citing Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC 
v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 620 (D. Colo. 2007)) (describing the expenses associated 
with e-discovery as potentially “outcome determinative”). 
 107 See Ward et al., supra note 102, at 170–71 (citing a study on costs associated with the 
review of data in the electronic discovery process that revealed “manual review of 30 gigabytes of 
data would cost up to $3.3 million”); see also Bennett, supra note 16, at 438 (stating that search 
and review are the priciest part of e-discovery). 
 108 Garrie et al., supra note 13, at 526; Ward et al., supra note 102, at 179 (discussing the 
2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory com-
mittee’s note to 2006 amendment; FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amend-
ment (noting that the 2006 amendments include e-discovery). The scope of traditional discovery in 
civil cases is fairly broad and allows parties to access relevant information that is “nonprivileged 
matter.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (presenting the scope and limitations on discovery); see also 
Ward et al., supra note 102, at 154 (describing the broad reach of discovery that can even extend 
beyond U.S. borders). This gives plaintiffs the ability to obtain “any matter relevant to the subject 
involved in the action” if they can show good cause. Ward et al., supra note 102, at 153. 
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regarding electronic data.109 Rule 26(b)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure sets forth limitations upon discovery of electronically stored in-
formation.110 In order to address cost concerns with potentially unreasona-
ble e-discovery requests, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) emphasizes proportionality.111 
When considering these requests, courts tend to weigh cost, relevance, and 
efficiency; specific determinations are left to the discretion of the judge.112 
In addition to traditional discovery, litigants can use subpoena powers to 
obtain information in a civil lawsuit.113 This power, as set forth in Rule 45 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has also been amended to include e-
discovery.114 The process to obtain subpoenas duces tecum—a demand re-
quiring recipients to provide requested documents—for electronically stored 
information remains in line with the treatment of traditional paper discov-
                                                                                                                           
 109 Ward et al., supra note 102, at 179; see also Garrie et al., supra note 13, at 526 (describing 
the amendment as a result of requests for the rules to reflex the complicated nature of discovery of 
electronically stored information). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 45 (containing instructions on 
how to address discovery of electronic material). Congress also amended Rules 16, 33, 34, and 37 
to address electronic data. See id. rr. 16, 33–34, 37. 
 110 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see Ward et al., supra note 102, at 179 (detailing how the 
2006 amendment modified Rule 26 to include e-discovery). 
 111 See Bennett, supra note 16, at 437 (stating that the Federal Rules require proportionality); 
Ward et al., supra note 102, at 170–71 (emphasizing the importance of weighing the burden and 
reasonableness of an e-discovery request when setting its scope). 
 112 See Ward et al., supra note 102, at 171 (“If a party can prove that the request for docu-
ments is an ‘undue burden’ the court can consider ‘cost-shifting’ and a number of other factors to 
determine who must bear the cost.”); cf. United States v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 62 F.R.D. 526 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (denying a subpoenaed third party the advancement of reasonable e-discovery 
costs because the third party, as a member of the public, would be among those affected by the 
outcome of the litigation and was therefore not simply a disinterested non-party). 
 113 See Ward et al., supra note 102, at 179 (listing Rule 45 as one of the discovery standards 
that have been updated to address electronically stored information); Michael J. Martin, Note, The 
Discoverability of E-Mails: The Smoking Gun of the Modern Era, 7 U. MASS. L. REV. 182, 196 
(2012) (discussing the use of Rule 45 in discovery to obtain emails from third parties); see also 
United States v. Crosland, 821 F. Supp. 1123, 1129 (E.D. Va. 1993) (“[T]he term ‘subpoena,’ 
most often encountered in the civil practice or grand jury context, carries with it a strong connota-
tion of ‘discovery.’”). 
 114 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a) (permitting a subpoena duces tecum to request production of elec-
tronically stored information); see also Martin, supra note 113, at 196 (discussing the amendment 
of Rule 45 to include electronically stored information). Under Rule 45(a)(1) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, a subpoena can command the recipient to “permit inspection, copying, testing, 
or sampling of the materials.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(D). Although most limitations on subpoe-
nas duces tecum in civil litigations mirror the ones in criminal cases, there are some additional 
limits on a civil litigant’s ability to obtain a subpoena. See id. r. 45(d) (“Protecting a person sub-
ject to subpoena . . . .”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2) (stating that a court can choose to quash a sub-
poena). One of the restrictions in Rule 45(a)(4) requires the moving party to provide prior notice 
before serving a subpoena duces tecum. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(4). This gives the other party a 
chance to object and time to file a motion to quash the subpoena. See Phalp v. City of Overland 
Park, No. 00-2354-JAR, 2002 WL 1162449, at *3 (D. Kan. May 8, 2002) (referring to why the 
prior notice subsection of Rule 45 exists). 
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ery.115 Rule 45 requires additional specification within the subpoena regard-
ing how the electronic documents should be produced.116 Furthermore, the 
notice restriction on subpoenas duces tecum for documents and tangible 
things carries over to e-discovery as well.117 
B. Subpoenas Duces Tecum in Criminal Litigation 
In contrast to the updated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
have clear-cut procedures on how to deal with electronically stored data, the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have not been updated to specifically 
address these technological developments.118 For now, since the standard 
remains unchanged, the government can often easily obtain a grand jury 
subpoena for electronic material.119 Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure sets forth the standard subpoena process.120 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(C)–(D) (adding electronically stored information to the rule); 
see also A. WALLACE TASHIMA & JAMES M. WAGSTAFFE, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: FED-
ERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 11:2254 (2015) (stating that a party can produce a sub-
poena duces tecum for electronically stored information). Litigants can issue a subpoena duces 
tecum in order to compel the recipient, whether it is the opposing party or a third party, to produce 
documentary evidence and objects. FEDERAL PROCEDURAL FORMS § 20:495 (West 2015). 
 116 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(C) (“A subpoena may specify the form or forms in which elec-
tronically stored information is to be produced.”); see TASHIMA & WAGSTAFFE, supra note 115, 
§ 11:2240 (describing different possibilities for production, including production with or without a 
deposition). 
 117 See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(D)(4) (outlining the standard for notice to other parties before 
service); TASHIMA & WAGSTAFFE, supra note 115, § 11:2251 (citing Biocore Med. Techs., Inc. v. 
Khosrowshahi, 181 F.R.D. 660, 667 (D. Kan. 1998)) (emphasizing the notice requirement). 
 118 Garrie et al., supra note 13, at 527; see also Joshua Gruenspecht, “Reasonable” Grand 
Jury Subpoenas: Asking for Information in the Age of Big Data, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 543, 552 
(2011) (asserting that unlike the civil rules, criminal rules and cases do not provide much guidance 
for electronically stored information). In the criminal context, the traditional discovery rule focus-
es on the defendant’s ability to gain access to the material documents that the government has 
gathered. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (detailing the materials from the government’s case that are 
subject to disclosure). Although defendants face stricter limitations, there are also restrictions on 
the government’s use of discovery in a criminal case. See 2 ORFIELD, supra note 102, § 16:11 
(citing Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820 (1996); Chao v. Fleming, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 
1041 (W.D. Mich. 2007)) (discussing cases that show how courts apply discovery restrictions in 
criminal cases with regard to defendants as well as the government). For example, courts are will-
ing to stay civil proceedings that are filed in connection with a pending criminal case. See id. (de-
scribing the necessity of not “expos[ing] the defendant’s theory to the prosecution in advance of 
trial”). By granting a stay, courts stop the government from taking advantage of the more lenient 
civil discovery rules to figure out a defendant’s planned defenses in the criminal case. See id. 
(“[The court has authority] to prevent parties from using civil discovery to evade restrictions on 
discovery in criminal cases.”). In addition to prejudicing the criminal case, denying a stay might 
lead to self-incrimination, which infringes upon a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. Id. 
 119 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 (detailing the current criminal subpoena standards); cf. Ward et 
al., supra note 102, at 160 (addressing the criminal electronic discovery by mentioning potential 
spoliation concerns that may arise with grand jury subpoenas); Kelly E. Stavnes, Note, Anonymity 
Protection Versus Subpoena Compliance: What Media Companies Should Consider When De-
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In criminal cases, the government can use subpoenas duces tecum to 
gain information or documents regarding anything that would be admissible 
into evidence.121 The U.S. Supreme Court has established three elements that 
the moving party has to meet.122 First, the information must be relevant; this 
requires courts to analyze the scope and purpose of the request on a case-by-
case basis.123 Second, the information must be admissible, though courts ap-
ply a more lenient application of the Federal Rules of Evidence because this 
                                                                                                                           
fending User Comments Online, 36 J. CORP. L. 697, 704 (2011) (discussing whether grand jury 
subpoenas can require reporters to disclose their sources). 
 120 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17; see 1 ORFIELD, supra note 102, § 6:89 (analyzing the scope of sub-
poena duces tecum in a criminal context). 
 121 FEDERAL PROCEDURAL FORMS, supra note 115, § 20:495; see Gruenspecht, supra note 
118, at 547 (explaining the long reach of the government with a subpoena duces tecum in a crimi-
nal case). A subpoena duces tecum compels a witness to “produce any books, papers, documents, 
data, or other objects the subpoena designates.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(1); see also United States 
v. Re, 313 F. Supp. 442, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (“[A] subpoena duces tecum is generally a legiti-
mate means by which the government may obtain records and documents relevant to criminal 
investigations or proceedings.”). Civil subpoenas requesting document production are sometimes 
equated with discovery, but in the criminal context, subpoenas duces tecum are more restrictive. 
See Crosland, 821 F. Supp. at 1129 (describing the differences between a civil and criminal sub-
poena duces tecum). Criminal subpoenas are not used for discovery but are rather meant to allow a 
party to compel specific relevant documents. Id.; see also United States v. Green, 857 F. Supp. 2d 
1015, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (“Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 17(c) is not intended to 
provide a means of discovery for criminal defendants.”). 
 122 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700 (1974) (articulating the three elements for 
obtaining a subpoena duces tecum); see also United States v. Binday, 908 F. Supp. 2d 485, 492 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (reiterating that the Nixon standard places these three limitations on subpoenas). 
In reaching the three-pronged test, the Court referenced a test established by the District Court of 
the Southern District of New York in United States v. Iozia in 1952. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699; Unit-
ed States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); see also Binday, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 492. 
In Iozia, the district court created a test that allowed the government or a defendant to require 
production once they showed that: (1) the information is admissible into evidence; (2) the infor-
mation cannot be otherwise accessed prior to trial through reasonable efforts; (3) the information 
is necessary in order to properly prepare for trial and lacking these materials could lead to unrea-
sonable delays; and (4) the subpoena has been requested in good faith. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. at 338; see 
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699–700 (referring to the standard that most cases have adopted and creating 
three hurdles in addition to the ones created in Iozia). 
 123 See Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319, 1320–21 (1994) (setting 
a lower bar for pretrial subpoenas duces tecum); Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 
U.S. 394, 399 (1976) (determining that relevancy is broader during discovery than it is at trial). 
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is a pretrial evaluation.124 Lastly, the request must be specific, precisely pin-
pointing the requested documents.125  
It is generally fairly easy for the government to obtain subpoenas du-
ces tecum.126 Often times, the government utilizes a grand jury to expedite 
the issuance of the subpoena.127 This inquisitorial power is uncertain and its 
limitations have not been fully established by statute, but it is not restricted 
by the same considerations that a general subpoena duces tecum would 
be.128 Courts are more lenient in allowing the government’s grand jury sub-
poena to move forward.129 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699 (considering the evidentiary value of the request); see also 
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 172 (1987) (setting limits on the applicability of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to pretrial inquiries). Nixon was decided before the implementation of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 172. The U.S. Supreme Court has not 
expanded upon the admissibility requirement beyond determining that Rule 104 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence does not limit pretrial inquiries to the rules of evidence with the exception of 
restrictions due to privileges. Id. (determining that hearsay does not matter in a pretrial inquiry). 
 125 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 387 (2004) (interpreting Nixon’s 
specificity prong to require a narrow and targeted subpoena request); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699 
(identifying certain enumerated documents within the subpoena). 
 126 See United States v. Vilar, No. S305CR621KMK, 2007 WL 1075041 at *46 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 4, 2007) (allowing the prosecution to request digital document production for all corporate 
records because the court found them “relevant” to the fraud claim at issue); Gruenspecht, supra 
note 118, at 552 (citing the few cases where subpoena requests had been challenged and acknowl-
edging that most third parties do not dispute government requests); see also United States v. Jan-
nuzzio, 22 F.R.D. 223, 228 (D. Del. 1958) (declining to allow a defendant’s subpoena duces te-
cum request because of a lack of evidentiary value). 
 127 See Application of Tex. Co., 27 F. Supp. 847, 850 (E.D. Ill. 1939) (acknowledging that a 
grand jury can subpoena documents in its investigation); Gruenspecht, supra note 118, at 547 
(discussing the statutory scope of a grand jury subpoena). 
 128 United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (holding that Nixon does not 
apply to grand jury proceedings because inquiries into relevancy and admissibility would result in 
cumbersome delay); Application of Tex. Co., 27 F. Supp. at 850–51 (“Beyond the briefest implica-
tions contained in the statutes, the Congress has not seen fit to define the jury’s power, or to des-
ignate the exact limitations upon it.”); see also Gruenspecht, supra note 118, at 547 (describing 
the constitutional bounds of a grand jury subpoena as “somewhat vague”). This relegates respon-
sibility to the court’s discretion “upon a particular set of facts and circumstances . . . just how far a 
grand jury may properly go or should be allowed to go.” Application of Tex. Co., 27 F. Supp. at 
850–51. In the past, courts have permitted subpoenas duces tecum even when the recipient is not 
the owner of the materials sought but merely possesses them. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 
465, 476 (1921) (stating that even if incriminatory documents were in the hands of someone other 
than the accused, a subpoena could be issued for the production of those papers); Re, 313 F. Supp. 
at 449 (“[S]ervice of a subpoena duces tecum on a person in possession of records belonging to 
another is proper.”). Under certain circumstances, the subpoena can even reach U.S. citizens on 
international soil. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(e)(2) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1783, which governs service 
of a subpoena in a foreign country). 
 129 See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 642 (6th Cir. 1983) (allowing the subpoena because the 
grand jury provides a “veil of secrecy”); Jannuzzio, 22 F.R.D. at 228 (“A Court should be liberal 
in a criminal action in holding documents to be evidentiary for the purpose of permitting a party to 
obtain their production at trial by subpoena.”); see also Application of Tex. Co., 27 F. Supp. at 
851–52 (“Congress has not seen fit to define the jury’s power or to designate exact limitations 
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The government does face some restrictions on its use of subpoenas 
duces tecum.130 A court can deem the subpoena terms to be unreasonable or 
oppressive and require modification of its terms or quash it entirely.131 Since 
the government can subpoena a recipient for documents they do not own, 
both the recipient and the owner of the requested materials can file a motion 
to quash the subpoena.132 It is difficult, however, to quash a subpoena be-
cause the recipient bears the burden of proving the government’s request is 
unreasonable.133 
Another restriction disallows the subpoena power to “violate a valid priv-
ilege,” which includes infringements upon constitutional rights.134 If the recip-
ient of the subpoena makes a legitimate constitutional claim, the government 
must overcome the level of scrutiny protecting such a claim.135 The court will 
review the government interest against the recipient’s interest and decide 
whether it will throw out the subpoena.136 The burden is on the government to 
show that the subpoena should move forward and can reach the recipient de-
                                                                                                                           
upon it.”); 8A BARBARA J. VAN ARSDALE ET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION 
§ 22:446 (2015) (detailing the requirements of a subpoena for pretrial production of documents). 
 130 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 698 (addressing limitations on subpoenas duces tecum set forth in 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 17); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 636 (citing United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974)) (discussing the limits on grand jury subpoenas); see 
also Margoles v. United States, 402 F.2d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 1968) (providing courts the discretion 
to reject subpoenas duces tecum). 
 131 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2) (“On motion made promptly, the court may quash or modify the 
subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.”); see Nixon, 418 U.S. at 698 (reit-
erating that Rule 17(c) does not allow for oppressive or unreasonable subpoena requests). 
 132 1 ORFIELD, supra note 102, § 6:89. 
 133 See R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. at 301 (discussing the standard of proof in a motion to quash 
a subpoena); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1186, 1201 (10th Cir. 2010) (apply-
ing the R. Enterprises, Inc. standard when considering a request to quash); In re Grand Jury, 111 
F.3d 1066, 1075 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing and applying R. Enterprises, Inc.). In 1991, in United 
States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted Rule 17(c) to give the govern-
ment the presumption that the grand jury subpoena was reasonable. 498 U.S. at 301. The Court 
emphasized the language of the rule, which only allows a subpoena to be quashed if compliance is 
unreasonable. Id. 
 134 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346. The Court pointed to cases where a criminal subpoena would 
have violated defendants’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Id. (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 
43, 76 (1906); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631 (1886)). 
 135 See In re Grand Jury 87-3 Subpoena Duces Tecum (In re Grand Jury), 955 F.2d 229, 231 
(4th Cir. 1992) (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)) (deciding that when a defendant 
has established a prima facie case, the burden of proof moves to the government); In re Subpoenas 
Served upon Wood (In re Wood), 430 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing Branzburg, 408 
U.S. 665) (stating that the burden shifts onto the government when a valid First Amendment claim 
has been made). 
 136 See In re Grand Jury, 955 F.2d at 234 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J., 
concurring)) (discussing Justice Powell’s opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, which indicated the need 
for courts to balance governmental interests with possible constitutional infringements); In re 
Wood, 430 F. Supp. at 47 (considering whether governmental interests outweighed defendant’s 
constitutional rights). 
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spite potential constitutional protections.137 When dealing with electronically 
stored information, courts will likely come across First Amendment issues.138 
C. First Amendment Rights at Issue in E-Discovery 
The First Amendment, which provides a constitutional right to free 
speech, likely covers anonymous online speech.139 In 1995, in McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that the 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 443 F. Supp. 1273, 1277 (D.S.D. 1978) (detailing the 
requirements for the government to “lawfully penetrate a constitutionally protected area”). To 
prove that the subpoena is still lawful, the government must meet four considerations: (1) the 
grand jury investigation is lawful; (2) a legitimate purpose exists for the grand jury investigation; 
(3) the grand jury subpoena is seeking relevant information or documents; and (4) the govern-
ment’s interest holds up against the level of scrutiny applied upon the infringement of the recipi-
ent’s constitutional rights. Id. at 1277–78. 
 138 See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) (discussing First Amendment protection 
of online anonymous speech). Although this Note focuses on potential First Amendment concerns, 
courts also encounter Fourth Amendment arguments when dealing with electronically stored in-
formation. See United States v. Sawyer, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1353–54 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (noting 
the Fourth Amendment issues that arise with online activity); Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Ex-
pectation of Privacy in and Discovery of Social Networking Web Site Postings and Communica-
tions, 88 A.L.R. 6th 319 (2013) (summarizing the application of the Fourth Amendment expecta-
tion of privacy test in relation to Internet communications). If this lenient standard applied to e-
discovery, it would create a loophole that the government could use to overstep search warrant 
requirements and Fourth Amendment rights that may arise with seizure of electronic data. See 
James T. Stinsman, Comment, Computer Seizures and Searches: Rethinking the Applicability of 
the Plain View Doctrine, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 1097, 1102, 1111 (2011) (describing how traditional 
warrant rules apply to electronic data, courts’ attempts to limit the scope of a search, and the prob-
lematic “dichotomy between the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement and the plain 
view exception . . . in electronic data searches conducted pursuant to search warrants”). Instead of 
targeting the defendant, the government could simply issue a subpoena duces tecum and compel 
third parties to disclose similar information. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(1) (stating that the gov-
ernment can subpoena a witness to produce “any books, papers, documents, data, or other objects 
the subpoena designates”). Some courts have given limited Fourth Amendment protection to 
online activity but most have not found a reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic infor-
mation. See, e.g., United States v. DiTomasso, 56 F. Supp. 3d 584, 594–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (find-
ing that private email correspondence did not affect defendant’s expectation of privacy); United 
States v. Lustig, 3 F. Supp. 3d 808, 827 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (deciding defendant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in advertisements posted on the Internet); Sawyer, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 1352, 
1356 (determining that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy over a “closed” 
peer-to-peer sharing program); Wilson v. Moreau, 440 F. Supp. 2d 81, 117 (D.R.I. 2006), aff’d, 
492 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2007) (accessing email through a workplace computer did not destroy the 
user’s expectation of privacy). But see United States v. Valdivieso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d 
332, 338 (D.P.R. 2007) (holding there is no expectation of privacy in emails that have reached the 
recipient). 
 139 See generally McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (finding a 
constitutional right to anonymous speech); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454 (providing some constitutional 
protection for anonymous online speech); Lyrissa Barnett Lidksy, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What 
Can We Learn from John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2009) (arguing that libel suits intent 
on unmasking anonymous online speakers threatened the First Amendment right to speak anony-
mously, but also recognizing the limits of such a right). 
2116 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:2093 
First Amendment protects anonymous speakers.140 Although the Court in 
McIntyre considered political speech contained in a printed pamphlet, lower 
courts have extended this protection to anonymous online speech.141 
The First Amendment may protect online data regarding monetary 
transactions as well. 142  In 2010, in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in certain situations, money 
could be a proxy for speech.143 The plaintiffs were challenging campaign 
finance legislation that limited a corporation’s ability to make political ex-
penditures. 144  The Court held that these restrictions violated the First 
Amendment because they quelled a corporate entity’s political speech.145 In 
reaching this conclusion, once again the Court acknowledged there is 
speech value in monetary transactions.146 Therefore, some believe that Citi-
zens United opened the door to a First Amendment speech right in virtual 
currency transactions.147  
                                                                                                                           
 140 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342 (holding that the First Amendment protects a speaker’s right 
to anonymity). 
 141 See id. at 344; see also Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454 (addressing the standard that should be 
used in assessing an online speaker’s First Amendment right to anonymous speech); Am. Online, 
Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377, 380 n.4 (Va. 2001) (referencing the 
lower court’s consideration of the First Amendment rights of anonymous online speakers). 
 142 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010) (holding that the 
First Amendment protects some monetary transactions that are used to fund speech); Sara Jeong, Is 
Bitcoin Free Speech?, SLATE (Feb. 7, 2014, 8:48 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/
future_tense/2014/02/bitcoin_as_free_speech_regulating_cryptocurrency_has_ramifications_for_
democracy.2.html [http://perma.cc/947J-DZFQ] (hypothesizing that Bitcoin transactions could be 
protected by the First Amendment); see also Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF, 
Internet Archive, and Reddit Oppose New York’s BitLicense Proposal (Oct. 21, 2014), https://
www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-internet-archive-and-reddit-oppose-new-yorks-bitlicense-proposal 
[http://perma.cc/AQN2-4235] (protesting New York’s BitLicense program, which regulates digital 
currencies, by pointing to a violation of speech rights). 
 143 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) 
(holding that limits on an individual’s campaign finance expenditures violated First Amendment 
rights). 
 144 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319–21 (detailing the events that led to plaintiff’s challenge of 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002’s restrictions on political expenditures). 
 145 Id. at 365. 
 146 See id. at 351 (noting that speakers “use money . . . to fund their speech . . . [and] the First 
Amendment protects the resulting speech”); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16 (analyzing the use of 
money as not purely conduct but involving primarily speech, primarily conduct, or a mix of the 
two). 
 147 See Jeong, supra note 142 (referring to Citizens United as placing speech value in mone-
tary transactions and arguing that this creates a possible free speech argument for Bitcoin use); see 
also Danny Bradbury, Bitcoin Is Crucial for the Future of Free Speech, Say Experts, COINDESK 
(Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-is-crucial-for-the-future-of-free-speech-say-experts/ 
[http://perma.cc/CP8C-B3V3] (emphasizing the value of Bitcoin in promoting free speech and 
specifically referencing WikiLeak’s use of Bitcoin donations); Kenny Spotz, If You Support Free 
Speech, You Support Bitcoin, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 21, 2015, 7:49 AM), http://cointelegraph.com/
news/113332/if-you-support-free-speech-you-support-bitcoin-op-ed [http://perma.cc/PG5N-KMSL] 
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D. Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides a civil option for 
plaintiffs to access the identities of anonymous Internet speakers.148 Con-
gress passed the DMCA in an attempt to control and restrict the copying 
and disseminating of copyrighted works in the digital realm.149 The DMCA 
allows plaintiffs to sue anonymous individuals who have violated copyright 
law on the Internet.150 Using § 512(h) of the DMCA, copyright holders can 
subpoena third-party Internet service providers to unmask infringing us-
ers.151 
Over time, courts have interpreted the DMCA’s subpoena power to ap-
ply only when an Internet service provider has stored the infringing material 
on its servers.152 Thus, the ability to subpoena an individual’s identity does 
not apply to providers that act only as conduits and nothing more. 153 One 
example is a peer-to-peer sharing system, where senders and recipients 
share files directly without uploading them onto an intermediary server.154 
Moreover, some courts have recognized a limited First Amendment interest 
in remaining anonymous on the Internet.155 To a degree, courts have even 
                                                                                                                           
(arguing that if money is a form of speech, Bitcoin use promotes free speech because it does not 
have traditional monetary restrictions such as requiring intermediaries to facilitate transactions). 
 148 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012); BELLIA ET AL., supra note 
18, at 340–42 (providing an overview of the DMCA). 
 149 See BELLIA ET AL., supra note 18, at 340, 410–11 (articulating the congressional intent 
behind the DMCA); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21–28 (1998) (report from the 
House Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection detail-
ing the reasons why the DMCA should be passed into law). 
 150 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h); BELLIA ET AL., supra note 18, at 408–11 (discussing the scope 
and application of the DMCA). 
 151 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (“A copyright owner . . . may request the clerk of any United States 
district court to issue a subpoena to a service provider for identification of an alleged infringer in 
accordance with this subsection.”). 
 152 Jeannie Roebuck, BitTorrent Sharing: The Case Against John Does, 18 INTELL. PROP. L. 
BULL. 35, 40 (2013) (noting that Congress is worried about chilling innovation by placing liability 
on intermediary services); see also Laura Rogal, Anonymity in Social Media, 7 PHOENIX L. REV. 
61, 72 (2013) (discussing the scope of the DMCA’s subpoena powers); Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, 
John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118 YALE L.J. 320, 339–40 (2008) 
(pointing to the DMCA as a method of obtaining a “John Doe subpoena”). 
 153 See Roebuck, supra note 152, at 40 (acknowledging a limitation on the DMCA’s subpoena 
power); see also Rogal, supra note 152, at 72 (confirming the Internet service provider must be 
storing the infringing content). 
 154 See Roebuck, supra note 152, at 40 (stating that the DMCA does not allow for subpoenas 
against peer-to-peer sharing systems). 
 155 Rogal, supra note 152, at 72; see also Gleicher, supra note 152, at 325 (examining how 
First Amendment speech rights are affected by what Gleicher refers to as “John Doe subpoenas”). 
Some courts have found that sharing materials through peer-to-peer networks constitutes speech 
under the First Amendment. See Rogal, supra note 152, at 72 (citing Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. 
Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)) (“[T]he use of [peer-to-peer] file copying 
networks to download, distribute, or make available for distribution copyrighted sound recordings 
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recognized that such an interest exists when it pertains to the use of peer-to-
peer sharing systems.156 
Courts balance a series of criteria in determining whether to quash a 
subpoena under § 512(h).157 Due to First Amendment issues that arise when 
unmasking anonymous speakers on the Internet, many courts are adamant 
that a factual basis for the request exists before allowing the subpoena.158 
The standard is strict: there must be a legitimate reason to justify the issuing 
of a subpoena.159 Courts have even compared subpoenas in a civil context to 
warrants in a criminal case.160 
III. UNMASKING BITCOIN’S HIDDEN IDENTITIES: CRAFTING A NEW 
SUBPOENA POWER USING EXISTING E-DISCOVERY RULES 
The absence of criminal subpoena standards for electronically stored 
information and the continual misuse of Bitcoin highlights the importance 
of updating government regulations to address this gap.161 This Part argues 
                                                                                                                           
without permission . . . qualifies as speech, but only to a degree.”). This protection is limited espe-
cially when that speech infringes a rights holder’s copyright. See Sony Music, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 
563. (rejecting an individual’s ability to use the First Amendment as a defense to intellectual prop-
erty infringement). 
 156 See Sony Music, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (recognizing First Amendment rights in a case 
involving a peer-to-peer network); Rogal, supra note 152, at 72 (analyzing situations where courts 
have considered peer-to-peer sharing as speech). 
 157 Stavnes, supra note 119, at 717 (listing the different factors a court balances); see Colum-
bia Ins. Co. v. seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578–79 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (providing important 
considerations when evaluating a motion to quash); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512. These factors in-
clude: (1) whether there is prima facie evidence of unprotected speech in the claim; (2) whether 
the claim can survive a motion to dismiss or summary judgment; (3) whether the subpoena is 
relevant to the claim; (4) weighing the interests of both parties; and (5) whether plaintiff has ex-
hausted all means available to identify the defendant. Stavnes, supra note 119, at 717. 
 158 See Matthew Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on Standards for Un-
masking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 833, 850 (2010) (noting that courts place 
a high burden of proof on plaintiffs before unmasking an Internet speaker’s identity); see also 
Rogal, supra note 152, at 73 (emphasizing a court’s hesitation to unmask an anonymous speaker). 
Courts are extremely careful because this is “an extraordinary application of the discovery pro-
cess.” See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 580–81 (explaining that the court wants to be sure the 
plaintiff has standing against the defendant before revoking the defendant’s anonymity). They 
have reached this conclusion because they are worried that the subpoena power could be misused 
to chill speech. See Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 720 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that a 
more lenient standard “would set the bar too low, chilling potential speakers from speaking anon-
ymously on the internet”); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457 (“We are concerned that setting the standard 
too low will chill potential posters from exercising their First Amendment right to speak anony-
mously.”). 
 159 See Mazzotta, supra note 148, at 850 (noting that courts require some “evidentiary show-
ing”); see also Rogal, supra note 152, at 67 (discussing a court’s weighing of a litigant’s right to 
legal recourse against an anonymous speaker’s First Amendment rights). One court even referred 
to its review of the subpoena as a “preliminary hearing.” Mazzotta, supra note 148, at 850. 
 160 Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 579–80; Mazzotta, supra note 148, at 850 n.121. 
 161 See infra notes 161–200 and accompanying text. 
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that the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress must craft a criminal subpoena 
power that reaches illicit Bitcoin use without infringing upon a user’s First 
Amendment rights.162 Section A explains why a new subpoena standard is 
necessary to target Bitcoin users engaging in criminal transactions.163 Sec-
tion B details what that standard should be, using elements of existing dis-
covery and subpoena rules and statutes.164 
A. Why Is a New Standard Necessary? 
In order to combat the criminal exploitation of Bitcoin, the U.S. Su-
preme Court and Congress must create a new targeted subpoena process to 
compel individuals or websites to disclose the identity of users conducting 
illegal transactions.165 No current statute exists that provides a targeted crimi-
nal subpoena standard.166 Due to Bitcoin’s open source nature, it is difficult 
to identify perpetrators who use the virtual currency to facilitate their crimi-
nal acts.167 There is no single company behind Bitcoin that the government 
can subpoena or raid; Bitcoin exists only on a network of computers.168 
Thus, the impact of an act like the Silk Road seizure disappears quickly 
over time.169 
                                                                                                                           
162 See infra notes 165–200 and accompanying text. 
 163 See infra notes 165–185 and accompanying text. 
 164 See infra notes 186–200 and accompanying text. 
 165 See Palmer, supra note 6 (noting the continued use of Bitcoin on black market websites); 
Wong, supra note 6 (mentioning the continuation of black market websites despite the govern-
ment shutdown of Silk Road and the incarceration of its operator); see also Lane, supra note 1, at 
553–56 (indicating a movement toward government regulation of Bitcoin). 
 166 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 (describing current criminal subpoena standards); Garrie et al., 
supra note 13, at 527 (highlighting the lack of criminal e-discovery standards); see also Gruen-
specht, supra note 118, at 552 (asserting that criminal rules and cases do not provide adequate 
regulation of e-discovery). 
 167 See Bryans, supra note 30, at 443 (discussing Bitcoin’s virtual anonymity); Kaplanov, 
supra note 29, at 167–68 (detailing the anonymous nature of Bitcoin); Lane, supra note 1, at 530 
(emphasizing the difficulties the government will encounter when attempting to identify Bitcoin 
users). 
 168 See Penrose, supra note 34, at 530–31 (referring to Bitcoin’s decentralized network); Kapla-
nov, supra note 29, at 167–68 (explaining how the decentralized nature of Bitcoin makes it difficult 
to regulate). Although there is no single company for the government to target, intermediaries such as 
Bitcoin wallet sites are “susceptible to regulation and enforcement.” Jerry Brito et al., Bitcoin Finan-
cial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 144, 146 (2014) (describing the ability to reach Bitcoin users despite the lack of a 
“company or central server”). 
 169 See Palmer, supra note 6 (noting the emergence of Silk Road 2.0 immediately following 
Silk Road’s closure). 
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The standard subpoena process set forth in Rule 17 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure is lacking in several ways.170 Without amend-
ing the standard to adapt to e-discovery, the current interpretation of the rule 
makes it difficult for the government to obtain desired electronic infor-
mation.171 To get a third party subpoena, the government has to show that 
the information sought is relevant, that it is admissible, and that the subpoe-
na specifically identifies the materials sought.172 
It is doubtful that the federal government will be able to successfully 
and in a timely manner use its current criminal subpoena power to unmask 
the individuals committing illegal Bitcoin transactions.173 The government 
likely cannot meet the specificity requirement because it would have to go 
through millions of transactions and hundreds of thousands of user accounts 
in order to pinpoint specific targets.174 The government might be able to 
overcome this by using a grand jury subpoena to expedite the process or by 
targeting websites where the transactions are largely illegal in nature.175 By 
focusing on black market transactions on sites similar to the now defunct 
Silk Road, the government could argue that a subpoena duces tecum requir-
ing the unmasking of each user is relevant and specific; however, courts are 
not likely to broaden specificity to allow the targeting of thousands, maybe 
even millions, of user accounts.176 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17; Garrie et al., supra note 13, at 527 (asserting a need for criminal 
e-discovery standards); Gruenspecht, supra note 118, at 552 (affirming the lack of an e-discovery 
framework in criminal contexts). 
 171 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 387 (2004) (providing a narrow 
interpretation of the specificity prong); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700 (1974) (explain-
ing the standard that the government would have to overcome in order to issue a subpoena duces 
tecum); see also Gruenspecht, supra note 118, at 552 (listing rejected, overbroad subpoena re-
quests). 
 172 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 700; see also Cheney, 542 U.S. at 387 (discussing the precision 
required to meet specificity); United States v. Binday, 908 F. Supp. 2d 485, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(reiterating that the Nixon standard places these three limitations on subpoenas). But see Kerr v. 
U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 399 (1976) (allowing a broad interpretation of 
relevancy in pretrial contexts). 
 173 See Cheney, 542 U.S. at 387 (setting a narrow scope on specificity); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 
700 (explaining the limitations placed upon traditional criminal subpoenas); see also Binday, 908 
F. Supp. 2d at 492. 
 174 See Cheney, 542 U.S. at 387; Nixon, 418 U.S. at 700; see also McIntyre, supra note 5, at 
344 (describing the government’s attempt to identify individual Silk Road users as an “impossible 
task”). 
 175 See McIntyre, supra note 5, at 345 (finding that a majority of Silk Road transactions were 
illegal). Contra Cheney, 542 U.S. at 387 (rejecting prosecution’s argument that specificity was 
met, because the discovery requests “ask[ed] for everything under the sky”). 
 176 See Cheney, 542 U.S. at 387 (setting a very limited scope for specificity); Nixon, 418 U.S. 
at 699 (identifying specific documents to overcome the specificity prong); McIntyre, supra note 5, 
at 344–45 (“The government’s allegation that the funds were involved in a money laundering 
conspiracy was . . . sufficient to justify forfeiture.”). 
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At the same time, if the government uses a grand jury subpoena to 
sidestep the difficulty of showing specificity, the framework becomes too 
lenient and open to abuse.177 Once the Bitcoin marketplace reaches the point 
where most individuals are engaging in legal transactions, lax subpoena 
standards become a problem.178  The U.S. Supreme Court and Congress 
must be careful when developing a criminal subpoena standard for Bitcoin 
because it will primarily affect anonymous speech, a crucial First Amend-
ment right that has been highly valued throughout U.S. history.179 If the 
government can easily issue subpoenas duces tecum and force marketplace 
sites to unmask individuals, it might infringe upon Bitcoin users’ First 
Amendment rights to maintain anonymity on the Internet.180 This creates a 
                                                                                                                           
 177 See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 172 (1987) (concluding that Nixon does not 
apply to subpoena requests arising during a grand jury proceeding); McIntyre, supra note 5, at 345 
(discussing the government’s lack of interest in discerning between legitimate and illicit uses of 
Bitcoin on Silk Road). An in-depth study of Silk Road found that 3.9% of items listed were books. 
See Christin, supra note 72. These were likely legitimate listings and the government seizure of 
related bitcoins likely intruded upon First Amendment rights. See McIntyre, supra note 5, at 345 
(“[T]he government did not trouble itself with distinguishing users who had purchased books from 
users who had purchased heroin.”). 
 178 See, e.g., Trautman, supra note 3, at 8 (referencing the idea that early adopters of techno-
logical development tend to use it for illegal means); Graham, supra note 2 (stating that when 
PayPal let merchants accept Bitcoin it gave the virtual currency more legitimacy); Rizzo, supra 
note 58 (discussing Microsoft’s acceptance of Bitcoin payments for virtual content). 
 179 Stavnes, supra note 119, at 699; see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 
310, 314 (2010) (upholding the importance of political speech by extending protection to certain 
monetary transactions); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (deciding 
that anonymous speech receives First Amendment protection); see also Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 
451, 454 (Del. 2005) (providing limited constitutional protection for anonymous online speech). 
This is especially true when it comes to political speech. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341–42 (strik-
ing down an Ohio statute that prohibited anonymous leafleting of campaign literature); Stavnes, 
supra note 119, at 699 (discussing the importance of anonymous publications and mentioning the 
Federalist Papers as an example). The First Amendment likely provides Bitcoin users some pro-
tection in maintaining anonymity but thus far, Fourth Amendment claims regarding electronic 
content have been less successful. See Wooster, supra note 138, at 319 (summarizing how the 
expectation of privacy applies to online communication). Although in specific situations courts 
have allowed a limited expectation of privacy in electronic material such as email messages, in 
general they have not been open to the idea that Fourth Amendment protections apply to electron-
ic data shared with third parties. See, e.g., United States v. DiTomasso, 56 F. Supp. 3d 584, 594–
95 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that private email correspondence did not affect defendant’s expecta-
tion of privacy); United States v. Lustig, 3 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (deciding defendant 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in advertisements posted on the Internet); United States 
v. Sawyer, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (determining that defendant did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy over a “closed” peer-to-peer sharing program); Wilson v. Mo-
reau, 440 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.R.I. 2006), aff’d, 492 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2007) (accessing email through 
a workplace computer did not destroy the user’s expectation of privacy). But see United States v. 
Valdivieso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.P.R. 2007) (holding there is no expectation of 
privacy in emails that have reached the recipient). 
 180 See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454 (Del. 2005) (acknowledging a First Amendment 
interest in anonymous online speech); McIntyre, supra note 5, at 345 (highlighting the govern-
ment’s disregard of valid listings on Silk Road that were likely protected by the First Amendment 
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far-reaching effect that would not apply to traditional subpoena duces tecum 
or grand jury subpoenas because they generally deal with witness produc-
tion of relevant documents in a criminal case and not identifying anony-
mous defendants.181 
The anonymous use of Bitcoin is likely to have some First Amendment 
protection following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 2010, in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission.182 Even though Citizens United only 
explores the idea of money as political speech, lower courts could apply this 
holding to virtual currency transactions.183 Since Citizens United tied spend-
ing money in the free marketplace to speech, it follows that the same logic 
would apply to virtual currencies used in online speech.184 Although these 
cases may protect money more when it is used in political speech, they still 
acknowledge some rights in money as speech in general.185 
B. Creating a Special Subpoena Power 
Virtual currencies like Bitcoin will continue to proliferate on the Inter-
net. 186  As the government moves toward regulating various aspects of 
Bitcoin, it must establish new e-discovery rules targeting users who have 
taken advantage of Bitcoin’s anonymity to commit illegal acts.187 At the 
                                                                                                                           
during their seizure of all user bitcoins); see also McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342 (concluding that the 
First Amendment protects anonymous speakers). 
 181 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 (discussing witness production of items before trial begins). 
 182 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314 (“All speakers . . . use money amassed from the eco-
nomic marketplace to fund their speech, and the First Amendment protects the resulting speech.”); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (noting that money is not solely conduct but also has an 
element of speech). The Court held that money could be considered speech, which gives it some 
First Amendment protections. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314. 
 183 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314 (describing the way that money should be viewed as 
speech in situations where corporate funds are used to make a political impact); Buckley, 424 U.S. 
at 16 (indicating that money can be used by individuals as political speech). 
 184 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314; Jeong, supra note 142 (arguing that a Bitcoin as 
speech analysis is not improbable); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 546 (ac-
knowledging that McIntyre extends limited anonymity rights to online speech). 
 185 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314 (discussing corporate political speech); Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 16 (discussing individual political speech). Furthermore, even if this concept is limited to 
political speech, it will still affect a subset of Bitcoin transactions. See Bradbury, supra note 147 
(emphasizing the importance of Bitcoin in political speech, specifically addressing how Bitcoin 
aided WikiLeaks when traditional credit card mediums prevented users from donating to the web-
site); see also Cahill, 884 A.2d at 546 (discussing the importance of anonymous online political 
speech). 
 186 See Graham, supra note 2 (referencing Bitcoin’s growing legitimacy especially after Pay-
Pal’s recent deal with Coinbase); Lee, supra note 13 (positing that it is too late for regulators to 
shutdown Bitcoin); see also Harper, supra note 13 (emphasizing that Bitcoin will remain even if 
government regulations persist); COINMAP, supra note 58 (indicating the growing number of busi-
nesses that accept Bitcoin). 
 187 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, supra note 13 (discussing virtual currencies and taxation stand-
ards); FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, supra note 13 (describing virtual currencies and FinCEN 
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same time, potential solutions need to ensure that the government will not 
be able to overreach and infringe upon the rights of legitimate Bitcoin users 
who wish to maintain their anonymity.188  The U.S. Supreme Court and 
Congress should amend Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
to reflect e-discovery, but with respect to Bitcoin, it needs to go one step 
further and specifically address the issues that would arise with revealing 
the identities of anonymous users.189 
When determining the initial threshold for the government to issue a 
subpoena, the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress should adopt the approach 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have taken toward e-discovery in 
Rules 26 and 45.190 The proportionality requirement added to Rule 26 is an 
important limitation that should also exist in a criminal subpoena statute.191 
The cost of e-discovery is less prevalent when it comes to identifying 
Bitcoin users because it is unlikely that privileged information is involved 
as opposed to documents available on a corporation’s servers.192 The main 
upside to implementing this restriction is that it will prevent the government 
from subpoenaing a website or Bitcoin wallet service to gain information 
about an unlimited number of transactions.193 This prevents governmental 
                                                                                                                           
regulations); see also Brito et al., supra note 168, at 144 (discussing how current financial regula-
tion would map onto Bitcoin and how potential regulation of Bitcoin intermediaries would oper-
ate). Once Bitcoin exchange and wallet sites are regulated, the government will have a source to 
subpoena for user information. See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 8, at 9 (describing the resulting 
decrease in anonymity once Bitcoin intermediaries have to comply with financial regulations). 
 188 See Rogal, supra note 152, at 67 (discussing the First Amendment protection of anony-
mous online speech); Stavnes, supra note 119, at 699 (emphasizing the importance of the right to 
Internet anonymity); see also Cahill, 884 A.2d at 546 (finding limited First Amendment rights in 
anonymous online speech); Bradbury, supra note 147 (reiterating that Bitcoin represents online 
speech in many situations). 
 189 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17; Rogal, supra note 152, at 73 (addressing why courts hesitate to 
unmask online speakers); see also McIntyre, supra note 5, at 345 (discussing the government 
overreach that grouped both legitimate and illegal uses of Bitcoin together). 
 190 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 45 (allowing judges general discretion in determining whether an 
e-discovery request constitutes an undue burden); FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 (containing no specific 
rules for e-discovery); see also Garrie et al., supra note 13, at 527 (emphasizing the need for guid-
ance on e-discovery in criminal litigation). 
 191 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26; Bennett, supra note 16, at 437 (“Inherent in the balance between 
production of information necessary for a fair search for truth, versus the burden and cost of dis-
covery, is a sense of ‘proportionality.’”); see also Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP AG, 264 F.R.D. 541, 
543 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (highlighting the importance of proportionality when applying Rule 26). 
 192 See Ward et al., supra note 102, at 170–71 (citing the costs of removing privileged infor-
mation from e-discovery material); see also Bennett, supra note 16, at 438 (detailing the expen-
sive search costs associated with e-discovery). 
 193 See Bennett, supra note 16, at 437 (describing the need for proportionality in e-discovery 
presented in Rule 26); Ward et al., supra note 102, at 179 (citing proportionality as a limitation on 
the scope of discovery); see also Martin, supra note 113, at 190 (stating that courts should careful-
ly consider proportionality when determining the scope of e-discovery). 
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overstep and potential infringement upon the First Amendment rights of 
legitimate Bitcoin users.194 
In addition, before issuing a subpoena to unmask a Bitcoin user, courts 
and grand juries should consider the same two concerns that courts contem-
plate when determining whether to quash a subpoena under the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act.195 First, in order for a court or grand jury to approve 
the subpoena, the government should be required to show some evidence of 
illegal activity.196 Second, the government should be required to show that 
the subpoena is relevant to the claim.197 When it comes to criminal subpoe-
nas, specificity and relevancy are important to ensure that the government is 
narrowly tailoring its actions to prevent treading upon First Amendment 
rights.198 
The other factors that courts consider when deciding to quash a DMCA 
subpoena should not explicitly apply to the initial approval of a criminal 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See Bennett, supra note 16, at 437 (putting forth proportionality as a check on e-discovery); 
Ward et al., supra note 102, at 179 (considering proportionality and reasonableness as checks on 
burdensome e-discovery requests); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314 (providing First 
Amendment protection for certain monetary transactions). 
 195 See Columbia Ins. Co. v. seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578–79 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (de-
scribing the factors a court will consider when assessing a DMCA subpoena); Stavnes, supra note 
119, at 717 (stating the five criteria that courts consider when deciding whether or not to quash a 
§ 512(h) subpoena); see also Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2012) (de-
tailing the statutory framework for a DMCA subpoena); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314 (ac-
knowledging the link between monetary transactions and speech rights); Cheney, 542 U.S. at 387 
(providing a narrow view of specificity within a traditional subpoena framework); Nixon, 418 U.S. 
at 700 (setting forth the three elements that moving parties have to meet for traditional criminal 
subpoenas); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 546 (extending limited First Amendment rights to anonymous 
online speech). 
 196 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h); Stavnes, supra note 119, at 717. This requirement prevents the 
government from randomly gathering a group of transactions or all the transactions on a general 
Bitcoin website and issuing a subpoena to identify those users. Cf. Stavnes, supra note 119, at 701 
(noting that online anonymity proponents worry about government interference stifling Internet 
activity). This standard is more lenient than the specificity requirement of Rule 17 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides more limitations. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h); FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 17. In the case of Silk Road, the government would have had substantial evidence that 
most, if not all, of the transactions involved illegal activity. See Trautman, supra note 3, at 10–20 
(detailing various illicit Bitcoin transactions uncovered by the government). 
 197 See Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319, 1320–21 (1994) (dis-
cussing standards for evaluating a pretrial subpoena duces tecum); Kerr, 426 U.S. at 399 (provid-
ing a broad scope for pretrial relevancy determinations); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 700 (requiring “rele-
vancy” as a necessary element in issuing a criminal subpoena duces tecum). This is a relatively 
low hurdle for the government to pass and is also one of the elements the U.S. Supreme Court 
established for Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 1 ORFIELD, supra note 
102, § 6:89. 
 198 See supra notes 165–185 and accompanying text. Courts have generally required specifici-
ty when evaluating a DMCA subpoena because it prevents bad faith and frivolous claims. See 
Gleicher, supra note 152, at 339–40. 
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subpoena request because they would be too restrictive.199 Although these 
factors should not apply to the initial decision to grant a subpoena, it should 
be left to the court’s discretion to determine whether to consider these other 
issues when reviewing a recipient’s motion to quash a subpoena.200 
CONCLUSION 
In the digital age, there are a growing number of legal and illegal Bitcoin 
transactions. In order for the government to target criminal use of Bitcoin, the 
U.S. Supreme Court and Congress must address the gap in e-discovery rules 
for criminal litigation. When constructing a subpoena power that allows gov-
ernmental entities to unmask anonymous online Bitcoin users in criminal 
proceedings, the Court and the legislature need to create a balancing test that 
fits between the tests for granting subpoenas duces tecum and grand jury sub-
poenas. Implementing a standard that is more lenient than the direct applica-
tion of traditional subpoena duces tecum to e-discovery will allow the gov-
ernment to directly target prohibited Bitcoin transactions. Most importantly, 
ensuring the standard is narrower than a grand jury subpoena will limit the 
government’s ability to infringe upon a Bitcoin user’s First Amendment 
speech rights. 
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 199 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h); Stavnes, supra note 119, at 717 (describing the other elements 
courts weigh in DMCA cases). If the grand jury considered the existence of prima facie evidence 
of the crime, it would be too high a standard for simply obtaining a subpoena. See Stavnes, supra 
note 119, at 717. This is especially true due to the higher burden of proof in criminal cases. See id. 
 200 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 45 (allowing judges discretion when defining limitations on e-
discovery); Stavnes, supra note 119, at 717; see also Margoles v. United States, 402 F.2d 450, 451 
(7th Cir. 1968) (giving the lower court discretion to determine the validity of a subpoena duces 
tecum); Application of Tex. Co., 27 F. Supp. 847, 850–51 (E.D. Ill. 1939) (finding that courts 
have some discretionary power when evaluating a grand jury subpoena). 
